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ABSTRACT
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) using machine learning is a next generation tool
to strengthen the cyber security of networks. Such systems possess the potential to detect
zero-day attacks, attacks that are unknown to researchers and are occurring for the first
time in history. This thesis tackles novel ideas in this research domain and solves
foreseeable issues of a practical deployment of such tool.
The main issue addressed in this thesis are situations where an entity intends to
implement an IDS using machine learning onto their network, but do not have attack data
available from their own network to train the IDS. A solution is to train the IDS using
attack data from other networks. However, there is a degree of uncertainty whether this is
feasible as different networks use different applications and have different uses. Such
IDS may not be able to adequately operate on a network when trained on data from an
entirely different network. The proposed methodology in this research recommends the
training set should combine attack data collected from other networks with benign traffic
which originates from the network the IDS is to be implemented on. This method is
compared with a training set which is completely composed of both attack and benign
data from a completely different network. The best performing model implemented with
both training sets demonstrated the feasibility of both scenarios. Both versions of that
model achieved an F1 score of 0.82 and 0.81 respectively, and both versions detected
roughly 70% of attacks and 99% of benign traffic. However, most IDSs trained on the
former training set listed yielded the best results. The main benefit of training a model on
target network benign data is to minimize false positive classifications. The average
model witnessed a 113% boost in precision, compared to their counterparts trained on
foreign network benign data. Another issue addressed in this thesis is the detection scope
of attacks. The IDS scope of detection is limited to the attacks it is trained on. Using the
proposed IDS training set, an intuitive feature selection scheme and classification
threshold adjustment, this thesis improves the IDS scope of detection to detect attacks
outside of its training data. Feature selection can manipulate an IDS to detect specific
attacks not included in its training data. Using threshold tuning, the IDSs in this thesis
detected up to 200% more attacks. Both issues and solutions are simulated and verified in
two separate scenarios using neural networks and random forest.
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Chapter 1 — Introduction
1.1.

Motivation
Since the inception of the personal computer, technology has progressively been

more integrated into everyday life. Especially due to the COVID-19 pandemic, both
organizations and individuals have become more digitally integrated than ever before. In
this digital world, a significant portion of everyday business operations is reliant on some
form of information technology infrastructure, which has introduced a series of new
opportunities for society to prosper. Unfortunately, this mass digitization has also led to
an increased volume of cyber-attacks. A successful cyber-attack on the correct
organization can result in billions of dollars in damages for governments and societies,
thus it is crucial to mitigate such attacks. Cyber threats are constantly evolving, which
may be difficult to defend against when they are first executed. This is called a “zero-day
attack”. One potential tool which may provide organizations and researchers to ability to
stop and disarm such an attack is an intrusion detection system (IDS).
An IDS is a frontline defense mechanism against cyber-attacks. As either a
software application within a host, or a dedicated device within a computer network, it
functions as an alert system to scan incoming network traffic and give immediate
warning of incoming attacks. This tool gives network administrators the opportunity to
quickly stop an attack from being successfully executed as soon as it occurs within their
network. The current IDS standard is signature based, which one key limitation is the
inability to detect zero-day attacks. This weakness can be addressed by using a machine
learning based IDS, which offers a wider scope to detect cyber-attacks.
The application of machine learning algorithms into IDS is an ongoing research
field, which offers immense potential to upgrade current IDS methods. Instead of
searching for specific attacks in network traffic, a machine learning IDS analyzes general
traffic behaviors and distinguishes suspicious traffic which may have malicious
objectives. This allows IDSs to become more robust, stop zero-day attacks and enhance
network automation.
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1.2.

Problem Statement
The current standard for machine learning IDS is network dependent, where the

data used to train the IDS originates from the same network the IDS is intended to be
implemented on. A key requirement to develop such IDS, is the collection of large
volumes of benign (non-malicious) and anomalous (malicious/attack) traffic data from a
single network. Benign traffic is abundant as most network traffic is benign and is thus
easy to collect. Collection of anomalous traffic data on the other hand, may be logistically
difficult to collect from a single, specific network in practical scenarios. There are
ultimately two options available to collect anomalous traffic data. The first option is to
simulate attacks on the IDS target network. For commercial networks that need to
constantly be fully operational, this option is undesirable as the networks normal
operation will be interrupted by the simulated attacks, and thus network downtime will
need to be scheduled. The second option to collect anomalous traffic data is to wait for
real attacks to occur within the desired network. This option is also undesirable in the
manner that it counterintuitive and time consuming. Ideally, real network attacks should
be mitigated. In the case that a single network can collect data from real attacks, the
duration of time to collect a sufficient volume of anomalous data with a diverse variety of
network attacks is unknown and may potentially take years. This is also true for
simulated attacks: it may take too long to simulate large volumes of attacks of different
varieties. Furthermore, both options pose the potential risk of causing damage to the
network, a risk all network administrators and organizations will not chance. Ultimately,
in realistic scenarios, it is a challenge to collect anomalous traffic data, and thus restricts
the ability to develop a strong machine learning IDS. Instead, IDSs should use attack data
from a global repository or from other networks. However, no work has ever been done
to study the feasibility of this, and how an IDS trained on data from foreign networks will
interpret the traffic of the target network.
The main doubt is transferability, because of the varying applications used on
different networks, and the different type of networks. For instance, it is unknown how an
IDS trained on data from an IoT network used for sensor telemetry would interpret
benign network traffic on a hardwired corporate office network. Most of the benign
traffic in the corporate office network might be composed of HTTP requests, whereas
2

most of the benign traffic in the telemetry network might consist of other protocols from
a proprietary application. Another concern is the interpretability of attack data. If the
exact same attack occurred on both networks, and an IDS is trained on the attack data
from the telemetry network, then the question is whether the IDS would be able to detect
that attack if deployed on the corporate office network.
1.3.

Thesis Contribution
This research evaluates whether network traffic from foreign networks can be

treated universally for training an IDS using machine learning and proposes a scheme to
optimize IDS detection for such scenarios. Practically, this can be very beneficial in
situations where entities wish to deploy a machine learning IDS on a network, but do not
have any collected attack data from that network. An alternate solution for those entities
is to use data from other networks, or data from a global repository. Hence, this research
aims to determine whether an IDS trained on data from a foreign network will be able to
detect attacks on a specific network.
Two separate machine learning algorithms are used to demonstrate the
effectiveness of this scheme, deep neural networks, and random forest. The datasets used
to train the models are large and contain a diverse variety of different cyber-attacks. The
IDS models trained can detect similar and new attack tools it hasn’t seen before during
that the training stage.
The proposed IDS lays out a procedure to generate a training set for an IDS using
network data from foreign networks. The ideal training set uses benign data from the
network the IDS will be implemented on, and attack data from a foreign network. This
thesis shows this method yields optimal results for detecting attacks. It is shown an IDS
trained exclusively on benign and attack data from foreign networks can interpret
network traffic in a new network but is not completely reliable. Instead, the proposed
scheme addresses and solves the main drawbacks of an IDS trained completely on
foreign network traffic.
Finally, this thesis simulates a realistic scenario where a trained IDS is faced with
cyber-attacks it has never seen before. A methodology is explored to assist the IDS to
detect such attacks, consisting of training an IDS on the proposed training set, alongside

3

tuning the classification threshold using the ROC curve, feature selection and cost
sensitive learning.
1.4.

Thesis Structure
There are five main sections in this thesis. Chapter 1 discusses the importance and

motivation behind this thesis, in addition to the contributions provided. Chapter 2 reviews
the preliminary technical background required to understand the work done in this thesis,
as well as literature review and the current state of IDS research. Chapter 3 discusses the
methodology and approach to perform the work in this thesis. Chapter 4 presents the
simulated results for the tested IDSs. Chapter 5 includes the conclusion and future work.
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Chapter 2 — Background & Literature Review
2.1.

Intrusion Detection System
This section introduces IDSs and provides fundamental knowledge about IDS

types and operation.
2.1.1. Basic Operation
IDSs are implemented in a network as either a software application running on a
host in the network, or as a dedicated device connected in the network. The basic
function of an IDS is to inspect traffic and to detect malicious activity. If the IDS detects
a suspicious packet, then the IDS will alert the network administrator. The network
administrator via a network management system (NMS) device will review the marked
traffic logs, and manually decide whether to act. Such actions may include restricting or
allowing traffic to/from the destination, altering firewall rules, etc. This tactic is called
“Passive Alerting and Manual Response”.
An extension of an IDS is IPS, which has an active response to a potential threat.
In addition to generating an alarm for the network administrator, an IPS will react to the
threat without human intervention, usually from a decision table [1]. IPSs have two
methods to defend against threats: reactive and proactive responses. The difference
between the two is reactive responses take immediate action upon detected threats, and
proactive responses are actions done prior to deter and mitigate an attack. IPS
development is a separate area of research in the network security and automation field
and is out of scope for this thesis.
In terms of network architecture for dedicated IDS devices, it is located behind
the network firewall at a network access point. Figure 1 is an example of IDS device
placement in a generic network. With the IDS and NMS connected to a switch, the switch
mirrors incoming traffic to the IDS. The IDS will perform information processing on the
forwarded traffic data. If a threat is detected, the IDS will alert the NMS, and the network
administrator will take action. If no threat is detected, no alert will be sent, and the

5

network operates as it did before. This operation is applicable for both anomaly and
signature types of IDS.

Figure 1 — Generic network architecture with IDS
2.1.2. Signature Based IDS
Signature based methods inspect packets by looking at specific data (byte)
sequences in traffic payloads. These payload sequences are known to be malicious by
cybersecurity researchers. This scheme is similar to anti-virus software’s using signaturebased methods to determine whether a file on a computer is potentially dangerous. A few
key advantages are it offers a high detection rate for known attacks and has fast
computation time. However, the downfall is it will only be able to detect known attacks.
Zero-day attacks, attacks where their existence is presently unknown by researchers, will
not be detected using a signature-based scheme. In addition, the signature database must
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be frequently maintained and updated. Otherwise, the IDS will miss threats that it easily
could’ve detected.
2.1.3. Anomaly Based IDS
Anomaly based methods inspect traffic by using machine learning algorithms.
There is a variety of different machine learning algorithms which can be utilized to detect
anomalies within networks. This is explored in section 2.4. These models are trained on
large sums of benign and/or anomalous network traffic data. The goal of an anomaly IDS
is to identify general malicious traffic behaviors within the network, instead of scoping
for specific attacks. Anomaly IDS show potential to detect zero-day attacks and attacks
which may not have been included in its training process. Given that this type of IDS
utilizes a complex algorithm and requires data preprocessing, a major drawback of this
IDS for some use cases is the increased computational requirement, and the slower speed
compared with signature-based IDS. Another drawback is the introduction of false
predications by the IDS. It is a certainty the anomaly IDS will predict false positives
(FPs) and false negatives (FNs). Thus, additional security provisions must be used in
conjunction to the anomaly IDS.
There are different forms of network data used by different anomaly IDS
implementations. The two most common data types are packet based and NetFlow. Most
academic IDSs use Netflow, as packet-based inspection is cumbersome. Packet based
inspection use a combination of different packet headers as features in the machine
learning algorithm. There are thousands of incoming packets per second in a network,
and it is extraordinary difficult for a single IDS device to keep up with the throughput in
real-time. The utilization of Netflow traffic data is used instead.
2.1.3.1. NetFlow
In 1996, Cisco introduced a feature on its routers to simplify analysis of large
volumes of packets. Currently, Cisco Netflow version 9 and IETF Internet Protocol Flow
Information eXport (IPFIX) are two of the several, most up to date NetFlow standards.
The definition of a flow is best described directly from IETF RFC 3917 [2], “A
flow is defined as a set of IP packets passing an observation point in the network during a
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certain time interval. All packets belonging to a particular flow have a set of common
properties”. For IDS analysis, utilization of flow-based features sacrifice accuracy for
computational speed [3]. Since a flow is a summary of movement of a set of packets,
some minor features in a packet which may contain vital attack information are
eliminated which may reduce IDS detection. The trade-off is the IDSs ability to analyze
all traffic data in real time.
Modern IDS datasets have adopted flow-based features as the standard. Table 1
includes a list and description of some NetFlow version 9 features as an example.
Feature Name

Description

IPV4_SRC_ADDR

IP Address of Source Device

L4_SRC_PORT

Layer 4 Source Port

IPV4_DST_ADDR

IP Address of Destination Device

L4_DST_PORT

Layer 4 Destination Port

IN_BYTES

Total Number of Bytes in ingress direction

OUT_BYTES

Total Number of Bytes in egress direction

IN_PKTS

Total Number of Packets in ingress direction

OUT_PKTS

Total Number of Packets in egress direction

FLOW_DURATION
TIMESTAMP

Total duration of flow (in seconds or
milliseconds)
System Time when Flow Capture Started

Table 1 — NetFlow features examples
2.2.

Attack Types
This section describes the general categories of different cyber attacks, and how

they are executed.
2.2.1. DoS & DDoS
The primary objective of Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks is to disrupt the ordinary operation of a computer network. These
attacks are generally accomplished by targeting the computational resources of key
network devices and surrounding network nodes. The mentioned computational resources
8

consist of; network bandwidth, router’s packet forwarding capacity, name servers,
memory/computing power on servers, or operating systems’ data structures.
DoS attacks manipulate certain functional operations in a system, forces a crash or to
overwhelm it. Within the TCP/IP model, these attacks occur on multiple layers, ranging
from application, transport, and network layers. An example of a transport layer DoS
attacks can range from repeatedly opening an incomplete TCP connection with the victim
network to waste its limited capacity of connections. A network layer attack may consist
of spamming the victim network with malformed/faulty IP packets to waste the victim’s
computational resources.
A DDoS is like a DoS attack, but the attacks are executed with more than one host
or an army of different hosts to attack a single network. These armies are usually
composed of hijacked hosts by the attacker. A commonly used term for this is “Botnets”.
2.2.2. Probe Attacks
Network probe attacks are used to discover network vulnerabilities, information
which will be useful in executing a different type of network attack. There are a variety
of different tools that exist to retrieve different network information. These tools can
perform; IP scans, port scans, firewall scans and brute force scans for common
vulnerabilities for different hosts in a network. Most of such tools are free and open
source. Some of these tools are; Nmap, MScan, Security Administrator’s Integrated
Network Tool (SAINT) and Satan.
2.2.3. Privilege Escalation Attacks
Privilege escalation attacks manipulate software or hardware bugs to escalate the
attackers’ permissions to a superuser, and bypass administrator approval. Once the
attacker receives superuser privileges, they have complete control on the software or
system they are accessing with elevated permissions and can easily perform malicious
actions which may be undetected. An attacker can either upgrade their privilege from a
normal user to a superuser, or from a non-existent user to a normal user. Some wellknown privilege escalation attacks are buffer overflow attacks, misconfiguration attacks,
race-condition attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, or even social engineering.
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2.2.4. Worm Attacks
Computer worm attacks are a form of computer virus. Rather than altering a
computers filesystem, they attempt to consume computer and network resources or such.
Computer worms also take advantage of network vulnerabilities by replicating
themselves among other hosts in a network. Several counter measures exist to prevent the
spread of a worm such as utilization of anti-virus software, network firewalls and access
control lists in networking devices.

2.2.5. Routing Attacks
Routing attacks manipulate fundamental functional operations of network routers.
There are two type of attacks, open shortest path first (OSPF) protocol attacks, and border
gateway protocol (BGP) attacks. OSPF is a protocol used to create a link state table,
allowing the router to know the best path to route packets for different hosts. To create
this table, the router sends link state advertisements (LSA) messages to survey nearby
hosts. Malicious hosts can manipulate various fields in these messages which can lead to
an unstable network topology. BGP is a protocol which allows multiple different
networks route packets between one another. Routers of different network clusters
regularly communicate with each other using BGP updates to ensure standard network
operation. Interception and exploits of BGP operations will easily disrupt a single or
multiple networks operation. Some examples include black holing (the silent disposal of
packets), packet redirection/subversion, both which will lead to network instability.
2.3.

Machine Learning Algorithms
Machine learning is an evolving research field with a growing domain of

applications, including networking, communications, and cyber security. The application
of machine learning algorithms is opening a new branch of research in both private sector
and academic research. Traditionally, research was executed through analysis, and
formulation of mathematical models specific to the research topic to achieve a desired
outcome. Machine learning based research operates in a different manner. Instead of a
human generating a mathematical model specific to a certain application, machine
learning uses a general mathematical form, and tailors’ different weights within the
10

model to achieve a certain outcome. This is called “training” the machine learning model,
in which the model processes and analyses a dataset and generates a relatively accurate
model for the problem at hand. There are several different algorithms which learn to
understand problems in different ways.
2.3.1. Categories of Training
There are two general categories of machine learning algorithms, each which fits
data differently. This section provides a description of these categories.
2.3.1.1. Supervised Learning
Most machine learning applications use supervised learning. In supervised
learning, data inputs contain a label of desired outcomes. A supervised machine learning
model will process the input features and make a prediction. The prediction is then
evaluated by comparing it to the labeled output provided in the datasets in the form of a
loss function. The model will tune its weights or parameters in a way to achieve the
global minima of the loss function. This is an iterative process where in each iteration,
the models’ predictions improve, and the loss function consistently decreases and
eventually the model will be trained.
There are two main categories of supervised learning problems, classification, and
regression problems. In classification problems, the model attempts to predict a
predefined/discrete class or category from the input. In regression problems, the model
predicts a continuous value based on the input. This is done by shaping a line of best fit
to the data.
2.3.1.2. Unsupervised Learning
Unsupervised learning models do not use labeled data. The objective of
unsupervised learning is to allow the model to independently identify sequences and
desired outputs in the data. From a mathematical perspective, unsupervised learning
algorithms operate by clustering or dimensionality reduction techniques. Clustering
algorithms identify data groups or clusters within a dataset. There are several types of
clustering algorithms using various mathematical policies [4], but the most common
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clustering algorithm is based on kernel methods. Dimensionality reduction algorithms
reduce the dimensions of the feature space of a dataset to provide a new projection of a
dataset which will clearly highlight any clusters in the dataset. Suppose dataset X, of n ×
D dimensions where n is the number of data entries, and D represents the number of
features in the dataset. The operation of dimensionality reduction will transform dataset
X into an alternate form, dataset Y of d features, where d < D [5]. Further processing of
dataset Y would indicate clusters of data.
There are a variety of different use cases for unsupervised learning. They are used
for anomaly detection, where the unsupervised model is trained to a single category of
data and will be able to identify anomalies. Another use case is clustering, to
autonomously categorize data based on different densities and clusters of data. The final
popular use case is dimensionality reduction, to combine and reduce features to be used
by a supervised model to reduce model complexity.
2.3.2. Machine Learning Algorithms
There are a multitude of different machine learning algorithms. The mathematics
and operation between these algorithms are vastly different. This section explores the
inner workings of the chosen machine learning algorithms in this thesis.
2.3.2.1. Neural Networks
Neural networks have two modes of operation, feed forward, which is used to
classify data, and backpropagation which is used to learn data.
Feed Forward (Classification)
Most neural network types are supervised learning and allow for direct calculation
of known outputs from a set of features. Mathematically, the output of a feed-forward
neural network is described in a general manner by equation 2.1.
𝑀

y(𝑥, 𝑤) = h (∑ 𝑤𝑗 ϕ𝑗 (𝑥))
j=1
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(2.1)

Where, y is the output vector, x is the input features vector and w is a vector of weights.
Finally, ℎ(∙) is a nonlinear activation function and ϕ𝑗 (𝑥) is a combination of nonlinear
basis functions, which is dependent on previous layers in the neural network.

Figure 2 — Activation of a single neuron
The first layer of each neural network consists of x. Each following layer of neurons
performs its own calculations with the preceding layer of neurons as the input. The output
vector before passing through an activation function is called an activation and is denoted
by aj. The activation of the first layer is mathematically described equation 2.2. “D”
represents the number of features in the input vector, and (1) indicates the weights
corresponding to the first layer. The wj0 term is called a bias.
D
(1)

(1)

aj = ∑ wji xi + wj0

(2.2)

i=1

Once aj is computed, it is then transformed using an activation function before
providing input into the next neuron layer. Equation 2.3 demonstrates this transformation,
where zj is the final output vector for that layer and ℎ(∙) is the activation function. Various
activation functions exist which may make major impacts on the result of the neural
network.
(2.3)

𝑧𝑗 = ℎ(𝑎𝑗 )

The second layer of the neural network may now calculate its outputs. The input to
the second layer is zj. “M” represents the number of neurons in the second layer. The
activation of this layer is observed in Equation 2.4.
𝑀
(2)

(2)

𝑎𝑘 = ∑ 𝑤𝑘𝑗 𝑧𝑗 + 𝑤𝑘0

(2.4)

j=1

A visualization of this neural network can be seen below in Figure 3. Layers in
between the input and output are referred to as hidden layers This example demonstrates a
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single hidden layer neural network. From the activation of the hidden layer, the activation
function is applied to receive the final output of the neural network, yk, as seen in equation
2.5. The dimensionality of yk is variable on the number of output labels provided when
training the neural network. Each value in yk is correlated with a certain output and contains
a probability for classification problems. The output value with the highest probability is
rounded up for the neural network’s prediction. Neural networks with multiple hidden
layers are called deep neural networks (DNN).
𝑦𝑘 = σ(𝑎𝑘 )

(2.5)

Figure 3 — Visualization of above neural network equations
An activation function decides whether the neuron should be activated and
introduces non-linearity into the model. Non-linearity is important because it allows for
neural networks to obtain a deep understanding of data by containing multiple layers of
neurons. The Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) is a common activation function because of
its simplicity and its handling of negative values. Equation 2.6 describes the ReLU
activation function.
ℎ(𝑎) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑎)
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(2.6)

Figure 4 — ReLU graph
For a binary classifier, the output layer contains one node, where the output must
represent a probability between 0 and 1. Therefore, a sigmoid activation function is used
in the output layer to scale the output of the neural network into a single probability
(equation 2.7).
1

ℎ(𝑎) = 1+𝑒 −𝑎

(2.7)

Figure 5 — Sigmoid graph
Backpropagation (Training)
Neural network training is an iterative process, where the neural network will
cycle through the entire training data set multiple times. Each iteration of the full training
set is called an “epoch”. Within an epoch, the neural network begins training with the
feed forward process and the calculation of a loss function. A loss function measures how
close a model’s prediction (y) is to the true output (ŷ), thus the goal of a neural network is
to minimize the loss function. Loss function minimization is performed using an
optimization algorithm such as the Adam optimizer or Standard Gradient Descent (SGD).
There are a variety of different loss functions which have specific problem applications.
One of the simplest loss functions is the Mean Squared Error (MSE), denoted by equation
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2.8, where N is the total samples in the training set. For binary classification, the Binary
Cross Entropy (BCE) loss is used (equation 2.9).
1

MSE = 𝑁 ∑𝑁
̂𝑖 )2
𝑖=1(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦

(2.8)

1

BCE = − 𝑁 ∑𝑁
̂)
̂))
𝑖 + (1 − 𝑦𝑖 ) ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 − 𝑦
𝑖
𝑖=1 (𝑦𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦

(2.9)

Another role of the loss function is to tune the weights within the neural network.
Equation 2.10 is an important formula for the backpropagation algorithm to tune the
individual weights in the neural network. This equation shows the relationship between
the loss function and each individual weight in the neural network. En represents the loss
function.
∂𝐸𝑛
∂𝑤𝑖𝑗

Where 𝛿𝑗 =

𝜕𝐸𝑛
𝜕𝑎𝑗

∂𝐸 ∂𝑎

= ∂𝑎𝑛 ∂𝑤𝑖𝑗 = δ𝑗 𝑧𝑖
𝑖𝑗

𝑖𝑗

(2.10)

. Upon readjusting the weights in the neural network, the next

epoch will commence, where the feed forward propagation is computed with the new
weights, and the loss function is calculated for the epoch. Once the loss function is
computed, the weights are readjusted, and the next epoch cycle will begin.
2.3.2.2. Random Forest

Figure 6 — Visualization of Random Forest voting
A Random Forest (RF) is an ensemble machine learning algorithm. The definition of
ensemble learning is a machine learning method that is composed of multiple different
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learning algorithms that work together to predict the output. RF uses multiple decision
trees to make a prediction. Each decision tree within RF is generated during the model
training phase. In addition, each decision tree is unique, where while training, a random
subset of different features is selected, and the nodes in each tree are built and then split
starting from the best features to the worst. A pseudocode algorithm provided by [6] is
shown in Algorithm 1. The training set data is denoted by Z (z1, z2, …, zN) and zi = (xi, yi),
and Z* are bootstrap samples of Z (random sub-samples of data). B denotes the number
of bootstrap datasets. Tb denotes a decision tree in the RF. The total number of features is
p.
Algorithm 1: Random Forest
1.Training
For b = 1 to B:
a. Generate bootstrap samples, Z* of size N from Z.
b. Grow a random-forest tree Tb to the bootstrapped data. This is achieved by
recursively repeating steps i to iii (below) for each terminal node of the tree
until the minimum node size (nmin) is reached.
i. Select m variables at random from the p variables.
ii. Pick the best variables among m.
iii. Split the node into two daughter nodes.
2. Output the ensemble of trees {𝑇𝑏 }1𝐵 .
The output of a RF for regression problems is described in equation 2.11. The variable
x is the input data.
1
𝐵
(𝑥) = ∑𝐵𝑏=1 𝑇𝑏 (𝑥)
𝑓̂𝑟𝑓
𝐵

(2.11)

The output of a RF for classification problems is described by equation 2.12. 𝐶̂𝑏 (𝑥) is
the prediction of the bth RF underlying decision tree.
𝐵
(𝑋) = 𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒{𝐶̂𝑏 (𝑥)}1𝐵
𝐶̂𝑟𝑓

(2.12)

There are variety of advantages provided by RF. Firstly, it automatically performs
feature selection and can determine important features on its own. Secondly, because of
the randomness while training, each decision tree is very noisy. This provides two
benefits where the RF model is robust to noise in the training data and is unlikely to
overfit the data from averaging. Third, the model can handle missing data values. Lastly,
RF is efficient on large datasets and can handle many features.
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2.3.3. Evaluation Metrics
Anomaly detection is binary classification, where there are only two categories of
data: anomalous (1) and benign (0). In the machine learning domain, there are metrics
used to measure the performance of a binary classification machine learning model. The
most important metrics are; recall, precision, F1 score and Area Under Curve (AUC) for
imbalanced dataset scenarios.
After the model has been trained, the models prediction results on the test dataset
can be analyzed to determine the model’s performance via a confusion matrix and its
underlying metrics: True Positives (TP), False Positives (FP), True Negatives (TN) and
False Negatives (FN). TP/TN are results which the model detected to be/not to be an
anomaly respectively which the prediction is correct. FP/FN are results which the model
detected to be/not to be an anomaly but the model’s prediction is wrong.
Accuracy
The accuracy of a model is the percentage of correct predictions made from the
entire dataset. From the four variables, the accuracy is calculated from the formula below.
Accuracy is an important metric but cannot be completely relied on to confidently judge a
model’s performance for unbalanced data. If a dataset contains 90% benign values, and a
model predicts 100% of the dataset as benign, then the model will achieve 90% accuracy.
Thus the accuracy metric is deceiving and consolation of other metrics is required.
Accuracy =

𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

(2.13)

Precision, Recall, F1 Score
Precision, recall and F1 score are analyzed collectively. Precision scores the
amount of correct anomaly predictions over the total amount of predicted anomalies.
Recall measures the amount of correctly predicted anomalies from the total amount of
anomalies in the dataset. Consideration of both these metrics gives a clear view of the
model’s performance. Another name for recall is sensitivity.
Precision =

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃
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(2.14)

Recall =

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

(2.15)

The F1 score a combination of precision and recall. It describes overall
performance in terms of precision and recall into a single metric.
F1 =

2𝑇𝑃
2𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

(2.16)

Specificity
The specificity is also known as the TN Rate (TNR). It is a ratio that measures the
rate at which the model correctly detects negative samples over the total of negatives in
the dataset.
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃

𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =

(2.17)

Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) & Area Under Curve (AUC)
The ROC graph is an alternate method to judge a machine learning models
performance. It shows all confusion matrix values for each classification threshold. The
axis of this graph is TP Rate (TPR) vs FP Rate (FPR). For the binary classification
scenario, a model will output a probability between 0 and 1. A threshold then must be
chosen as a final classification. For example, if the model outputs 0.67 and the threshold
is 0.5, the output will be rounded to 1. Typically, 0.5 is the default threshold. The preview
of the ROC curve allows for quick understanding of the model’s potential performance.
The ideal classifier will have a ROC curve that intersects with TPR = 1 and FPR = 0.
The AUC metric is the area under curve. It provides additional detail about the
model’s performance alongside the ROC curve. Ideally, the AUC should be maximized,
where the most optimal AUC value is 1. An AUC of 0.5 is equivalent to that of a random
classifier. Anything within range of 0.5 or below means the model performance is
equivalent or worse than a random classifier.
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Figure 7 — ROC curves and AUC
A method to discover the optimal classifier threshold from the ROC curve is to
use Youden’s J statistic, denoted by equation 2.18. This equation is calculated for each
point on the ROC curve and determines the optimal threshold.
𝐽 =
2.4.

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

+

𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃

–1

(2.18)

Literature Review & Related Works
Several machine learning algorithms may be used to create an anomaly-based

IDS. This section will provide an overview of existing research, important metrics to
evaluate anomaly-based IDSs and provide background detail for existing IDS datasets.
2.4.1. Overview
In [7], a taxonomy was done analyzing difference implementations of different
IDS systems since the conception of an IDS in the early 2000’s, until 2020. 97.5% of
research relies on a machine learning algorithm, and the remainder is equally distributed
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between knowledge-based and statistical approaches. Knowledge based systems use
finite state machines and rules, and statistical approaches use univariate, multivariate and
time series probabilistic models.
From the IDS survey papers [8, 9, 10, 11, 12], the consensus claims deep learning
is a better approach for IDS systems for several different network types. Compared to
traditional machine learning algorithms, deep learning yields better detection and
eliminates the need for feature engineering, allowing for simpler tuning of the model.
Thus, in recent academic works, deep learning is the most widely adopted algorithm for
anomaly-based IDS [7].
Both supervised and unsupervised deep learning approaches have been
implemented. Most models are implemented on the KDD-99 or NSL-KDD dataset. Using
supervised learning, deep neural network (DNN), convolutional neural networks (CNN)
and recurrent neural networks (RNN) are shown to achieve the best performance. From
unsupervised learning, autoencoders (AE), deep belief networks (DBN) and are most
widely appreciated.
2.4.2. Classifier Model Development for IDS
The scope of this section is to discuss related works where the model is used
strictly as a classifier in the IDS pipeline. Works that use multiple datasets do not merge
them all into a single IDS like in this thesis, nor do they test their IDS on different
datasets.
2.4.2.1. Random Forest
[13] uses RF on the NSL-KDD dataset. Their approach uses feature selection to
reduce dimensionality and use 10 folder cross validation to train the model. However, the
hyperparameters for their decision tree is not specified. Their results claim their model
achieves 99% accuracy and detection rate on all attacks. [14] compares support vector
machine (SVM) and RF on the KDD ’99 dataset. Their comparison claims SVM
produces more accurate results, but RF takes a quarter of the time to train compared to
SVM. [15] uses a two-stage approach on the ISCX 2012 dataset. A text-based CNN is
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used to extract payload data its output alongside other statistical features is fed into a RF
to classify the data. This model achieved 99.13% accuracy.
2.4.2.2. Deep Neural Network
A variety of neural network architectures have been tested and implemented on
most available datasets. In [16], a distributed IDS was developed using DNN’s. The final
DNN architecture was developed through rigorous testing of different architectures on
five different flow-based benchmark datasets individually for both anomaly and
multiclass classifications. This article found a DNN with 5 hidden layers with dropout
and batch normalization in addition to feature selection yielded the best results for both
anomaly and multiclass classification. Another study [17], developed a custom dataset
with flow-based features using the Cooja IoT simulator, and developed a DNN IDS to
detect routing attacks in IoT networks. Each dataset focused on a specific attack type. A
similar rigorous, trial and error approach was used to test a variety of neural network
architectures. The final DNN architecture consists of 5 hidden layers, with neuron counts
ranging from 50 to 300 in each layer. Feature selection, dropout and regularization were
all used in conjunction with the DNN. The accuracy on their own datasets ranges from
94.5% to 99.5%.
2.4.2.3. Convolutional Neural Network
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) are mainly used for image processing
applications. Unexpectedly within the IDS domain, CNNs have found an appreciation by
converting network data into images and passing these images through a developed CNN
model. S. Potluri et al. [18] develop a CNN for both the NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15
datasets by converting each packet into a binary vector dimensions, and then turning each
vector in a 8 x 8 grayscale image. The resulting CNN can achieve 91.14% accuracy on
NSL-KDD and 94.9% on UNSW-NB15. Other formats are embedding dataset data into
matrices and using that as input for a CNN. Other use cases for CNNs are to extract and
learn valuable features, which is discussed further in section 2.4.3.1.
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2.4.2.4. Recurrent Neural Network
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) are predominately utilized to supersede flowbased detection methods, in favour of packet level data. For instance, [19] develops and
compares LSTM (Long Short Term Memory), Conditional Random Fields (CRF) and
Transformer models on their own version of the CIC-IDS2017 dataset using time slotbased features created from the original pcap files. The transformer model substantially
outperformed the other two models, and methods such as dropout and feature selection
were used. Model hyperparameters were tuned through rigorous testing, and
hyperparameters from models with the greatest F-score were selected. Hwang et al. [20]
develops an LSTM model for IDS packet level inspection. Their algorithm embeds
packet header fields into a sentence and performs anomaly-based detection on three
datasets separately. The achieved accuracy is 99%, where the detection time per packet is
maximum 2 seconds. In terms of flow based RNN IDS, Yin et al. [21] developed such for
both binary and multiclass scenarios, achieving 97.04% accuracy. However, this model is
purely reliant on the NSL-KDD dataset and is developed to demonstrate the advantage of
deep learning over traditional machine learning algorithms, and therefore has little
emphasis on feature selection and hyperparameter optimization.
2.4.2.5. Autoencoder
For anomaly-based detection, autoencoders have demonstrated favourable results.
Hwang et al. [22] developed a CNN-Autoencoder model for speedy IDS. The CNN
module is used to learn important features, and the autoencoder module is used for threat
classification. Their model was trained in multiple scenarios (training data was benign
only or was mixed between benign and malicious) to determine optimal training
scenarios. Also, the medium of inspection is packet based, where the first packets in a
flow are inspected. The resulting accuracy is claimed to be near 100%. The majority of
autoencoder deployments for IDS are used for feature extraction to optimize other
models, which is expanded upon in section 2.4.3.1.
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2.4.2.6. Deep Belief Networks
DBNs are another form of unsupervised deep learning algorithms that is basically
a series of stacked Restricted Boltzmann Machines (RBM). Many DBN use cases are for
feature extraction, however DBN for threat classification has been implemented. Zhang
et al. [23] develop DBN models on the KDD-99 dataset, where each model is optimized
specifically to detect a single attack category. To tune the hyperparameters of each model
such as hidden layers, hidden unit, etc., a genetic algorithm was used. The detection rates
for each of the four categories range from 97.73% to 99.68%. Tian et al. [24] implement
their own methods to improve DBM development using probabilistic mass functions and
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence at each RBM layer of the DBN to optimize the feature
extraction in the model. The accuracy for the tested datasets are, NSL-KDD: 96.17% and
UNSW-NB15: 86.49%. Rigorous experimentation was used to develop this model.
2.4.3. IDS Feature Selection Methods
This literature review section provides examples of different feature selection
methods for intrusion detection systems.
2.4.3.1. Manual Feature Extraction & Selection
Another method to select key features for an IDS model is through manual
selection. The effectiveness of some features like IP address and port numbers remains
unclear. Fernandez and Xu [25] perform a case study for these features. They develop a
DNN, and compare the model’s performance with, and without IP and port. Their results
show including the first three octets IP address and port number may improve
performance for a DNN IDS.
2.4.3.2. Learned Feature Extraction & Selection
There are a variety of works that use deep learning algorithms specifically for
feature extraction to assist threat classifiers achieve better results than using raw feature
vectors. The primary methods for feature extraction are CNN, Autoencoder and DBN.
A 1-dimension (grayscale image) CNN feature extractor is used in [22], where a set
number of packet data from a flow is converted into an image. Smaller size packet data is
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padded with zeroes to make each pixel in an image correlate with a specific feature. Their
CNN attempts to generally categorize each flow by related application type, which is
specific to the dataset they use. The trailing autoencoder is used to identify benign and
malicious traffic.
Autoencoders are most widely used for IDS feature extraction. Autoencoders may
be used to initialize DNN weights and structure, as is done in [26]. An autoencoder is
trained on the unlabeled benign data to understand critical features. The trained
autoencoder structure and weights is then transferred to a feed forward DNN, where then
the model is then retrained using supervised learning. B. Zhang et al. [27] stack an
autoencoder on top of a binary tree to perform feature extraction and compare
autoencoder and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for feature extraction. Their
results show using a stacked autoencoder improves feature extraction and detection rates
collectively. Their hybrid classifier also targets to solve class imbalance issues, a
common problem faced by all IDS researchers. Hongpo Zhang et al. [28] use an
autoencoder for feature selection and a DNN as a classifier. Using an autoencoder, they
are able realize the most impactful features, and select 12 of 202 features as input to their
classifier. The final accuracy of their model is 98.8% on the UNSW-NB15 dataset.
DBNs are another popular option for feature extraction and selection. Hao Zhang et al.
[29] couple a DBN for feature extraction and a series of support vector machines (SVM)
for real time classification. The DBN first undergoes a pretraining phase where each
RBM layer is trained independently to provide better initial weights for the model. Then
the DBN is trained using unlabeled data. Their DBN structure can reduce the dataset
feature dimensionality, which is crucial for SVM implementations.
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Chapter 3 — Methodology & Description of Work
3.1.

Overview
This section introduces the different processing stages of the proposed work. In

addition, details about the development environment and libraries used are provided.
3.1.1. Pipeline
A generalized, high-level explanation of the model training and testing process is
discussed in this section. For supervised learning, there are three fundamental steps to
develop and evaluate a working model: data preprocessing, model training, and model
testing.
Data preprocessing is always the first stage, and unarguably the most important
stage. The purpose of this stage is to prepare the data for model training. First, the IDS
datasets used are duplicated and then sanitized to eliminate faulty data which is unusable.
This includes all rows that contain NaN or infinite values which are deleted from the
dataset. Next, further preprocessing steps are taken such as organizing data classes and
subclass distributions for the training set, generating a validation/test set, scaling the data,
and saving the scaled training, validation, and test sets to files.
In total, the UQ-NIDS-v2 dataset contains four datasets from different networks,
where each dataset is simulated separately on a unique network. The attack data between
each dataset is unique and some datasets have common attack subclasses, but no dataset
has a complete overlap. Since the goal of this thesis is demonstrate the potential of an
IDS trained on data from a multitude of different networks, the training/validation/test
data contains three of four datasets (datasets A, B, C), and the evaluation data is the
remaining dataset (dataset D). This simulates an IDS being trained on data from unique
foreign networks and being used on the target network. The attack data in the evaluation
set is always untouched, but the benign data is altered in some scenarios, which will be
discussed further in other sections. If scaling is used on the training set, then the
evaluation set it scaled also.
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Figure 8 — A flowchart of the general IDS development process
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The model training stage is very straightforward. This stage includes choosing a
machine learning algorithm, its hyperparameters, architecture and training the model. The
training varies by the machine learning algorithm used. For DNN, the model is trained on
the training set, and validated using the validation set. For RF, a variety of different
models are trained using cross validation, and only the best models proceed to the testing
stage.
The testing stage consists of evaluating the model on the test set (data separated
from training set) and analyzing the results. Different tools and graphs are used to
analyze the model’s performance. This includes the ROC curve, the confusion matrix,
precision, recall and F1 score. Models that perform well on the training set are then
evaluated on the evaluation set. The same tools are used with addition of an attack
classification report which graphs the detection for each attack subclass.
3.1.2. Development Environment
The work presented is developed using Python 3.8, with combination of a variety
of different libraries. The libraries used and their corresponding versions can be seen
below in Table 2. The reasoning behind the selection of these libraries is because they are
well developed and are widely used by machine learning practitioners, allowing for a
smooth and streamlined development of machine learning algorithms. The integrated
development environment (IDE) used is JupyterLab version 3.0.14. Pandas is used to
manipulate and organize the data. The library used to develop DNNs is Keras
TensorFlow and Scikit-Learn for RF. Matplotlib, Scikit-Learn and Seaborn are used to
assist with model results analysis.
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Library

Version Description

TensorFlow

2.5.0

Machine learning library with focus on deep learning

Keras

2.4.3

Python interface for simplified implementation of
TensorFlow

Matplotlib

3.4.2

Plotting library used for creating plots and graphs

Seaborn

0.11.1

Plotting library with focus on data science

Pandas

1.3.0

Library used for data manipulation and analysis

Numpy

1.19.5

Python interface library to compute mathematical operations

Scikit Learn 0.24.2

Machine learning library with focus on traditional machine
learning algorithms, and other machine learning tools

Unbalanced

0.8.0

Learn

Library with tools to compensate imbalanced datasets. The
primary tool from this library for this thesis is SMOTE.

Table 2 — List of Python Libraries and Packages used
3.2.

Datasets and Data Understanding
This section provides a detail of the dataset networks, including information such

as network types, simulation details, dataset class tallies, included features, and a brief
explanation on each attack tools functionality.
3.2.1.1. Background
A common issue with existing datasets prior to the creation of the UQ-NIDSv1/v2 datasets is the lack of overlapping features between different datasets. Because of
this, it is difficult to work between different datasets interchangeably and to compare
models on each dataset. M. Sarhan et al. [30] from the University of Queensland
recompiled multiple popular IDS datasets from their original packet capture (pcap) files
to fit all the datasets under the exact same NetFlow features. The four datasets included
are the: UNSW-NB15, CSE-CIC-IDS2018, ToN-IoT and BoT-IoT datasets. The UNSWNB15 and CSE-CIC-IDS2018 datasets are among the most widely used for IDS research.
UQ-NIDS-v2 is chosen for several reasons. The shared feature base between multiple
datasets allows an IDS to be trained on traffic from a variety of different networks with
different applications, and to be evaluated on a totally new network with its own
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independent purpose and unique attacks. The second reason is because it is reflective of
modern networks. Other datasets, like KDD-99 (1999) and its variants receive much
criticism because they do not adequately reflect modern networks and applications.
3.2.1.2. Features
The names and description of the UQ-NIDS-v2 features is shown. There are 43
total features.
Feature Name
IPV4_SRC_ADDR
IPV4_DST_ADDR
L4_SRC_PORT
L4_DST_PORT
PROTOCOL
L7_PROTO
IN_BYTES
IN_PKTS
OUT_BYTES
OUT_PKTS
TCP_FLAGS
CLIENT_TCP_FLAGS
SERVER_TCP_FLAGS
FLOW_DURATION_MILLISECONDS
DURATION_IN
DURATION_OUT
MIN_TTL
MAX_TTL
LONGEST_FLOW_PKT
SHORTEST_FLOW_PKT
MIN_IP_PKT_LEN
MAX_IP_PKT_LEN
SRC_TO_DST_SECOND_BYTES
DST_TO_SRC_SECOND_BYTES
RETRANSMITTED_IN_BYTES
RETRANSMITTED_IN_PKTS
RETRANSMITTED_OUT_BYTES
RETRANSMITTED_OUT_PKTS

Description
IPv4 source address
IPv4 destination address
IPv4 source port number
IPv4 destination port number
IP protocol identifier byte
Layer 7 protocol (numeric)
Incoming number of bytes
Outgoing number of bytes
Incoming number of packets
Outgoing number of packets
Cumulative of all TCP flags
Cumulative of all client TCP flags
Cumulative of all server TCP flags
Flow duration in milliseconds
Client to Server stream duration (msec)
Server to Client stream duration (msec)
Min flow Time To Live (TTL)
Max flow Time to Live (TTL)
Longest packet (bytes) of the flow
Shortest packet (bytes) of the flow
Len of the smallest flow IP packet
observed
Len of the largest flow IP packet observed
Src to dst Bytes/sec
Dst to src Bytes/sec
# of retransmitted TCP flow bytes (src>dst)
# of retransmitted TCP flow packets (src>dst)
# of retransmitted TCP flow bytes (dst>src)
# of retransmitted TCP flow packets (dst>src)
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SRC_TO_DST_AVG_THROUGHPUT
DST_TO_SRC_AVG_THROUGHPUT
NUM_PKTS_UP_TO_128_BYTES
NUM_PKTS_128_TO_256_BYTES
NUM_PKTS_256_TO_512_BYTES
NUM_PKTS_512_TO_1024_BYTES

Src to dst average thpt (bps)
Dst to src average thpt (bps)
Packets whose IP size <= 128
Packets whose IP size > 128 and <= 256
Packets whose IP size > 256 and <= 512
Packets whose IP size > 512 and <= 1024
Packets whose IP size > 1024 and <=
NUM_PKTS_1024_TO_1514_BYTES
1514
TCP_WIN_MAX_IN
Max TCP Window (src->dst)
TCP_WIN_MAX_OUT
Max TCP Window (dst->src)
ICMP_TYPE
Type * 256 + ICMP code
ICMP_IPV4_TYPE
ICMP Type
DNS_QUERY_ID
DNS query transaction Id
DNS_QUERY_TYPE
DNS query type (e.g. 1=A)
DNS_TTL_ANSWER
TTL of the first A record (if any)
FTP_COMMAND_RET_CODE
FTP client command return code
Table 3 — List of features and descriptions for UQ-NIS-v2
3.2.1.3. Data Breakdown
A breakdown of the UQ-NIDS-v2 data is provided in the table below with counts
and description. All the attacks between each dataset are listed under a general category.
Clearly, the dataset is very large with 75 million total data samples. Most of the data is
anomalous, whereas approximately a third of the entire dataset is benign traffic.
Category
Benign
DDoS
DoS
Probe
XSS
Brute Force
Injection

Count
Description
25,165,295 Normal unmalicious flows.
An attempt like DoS but has multiple different distributed
21,748,351 sources.
An attempt to overload a computer system’s resources
with the aim of preventing access to or availability of its
17,875,585 data.
A group that intends to collect information about
6,533,857 networks ports, applications, IPs.
Cross-site Scripting is a type of injection in which an
attacker uses web applications to send malicious scripts
24,55,020 to end-users.
A technique that aims to obtain usernames and password
1,274,235 credentials by accessing a list of predefined possibilities.
A variety of attacks that supply untrusted inputs that aim
to alter the course of execution, with SQL and code
687,967 injections two of the main ones.

31

Botnet

143,097

Exploits

31,551

Fuzzers

22,310

Backdoor

18,978

Generic

16,560

MITM

7,723

Ransomware

3,425

Theft

2,431

Shellcode

1,427

An attack that enables an attacker to remotely control
several hijacked computers to perform malicious
activities.
Sequences of commands controlling the behaviour of a
host through a known vulnerability.
An attack in which the attacker sends large amounts of
random data which cause a system to crash and aim to
discover security vulnerabilities in a system.
A technique that aims to bypass security mechanisms by
replying to specific constructed client applications.
A method that targets cryptography and causes a collision
with each block-cipher.
A method that places an attacker between a victim and
host with which the victim is trying to communicate, with
the aim of intercepting traffic and communications.
An attack that encrypts the files stored on a host and asks
for compensation in exchange for the decryption
technique/key.
A group of attacks that aims to obtain sensitive data such
as data theft and keylogging
A malware that penetrates a code to control a victim’s
host.
Attacks that replicate themselves and spread to other
computers.

Worms
164
Grand Total
75,987,976
Table 4 — List of all attacks, with distributions and descriptions
3.2.2. Underlying Datasets

The following section describes the networks used to generate each underlying
dataset and provides a tally of different attacks and benign data.
3.2.2.1. NF-UNSW-NB15
The original UNSW-NB15 dataset [31] was created in 2015 to address the issues
related to the KDD-99 dataset and its variants. The simulation test bed is designed to
mimic attacks on a generic corporate network. A traffic simulation tool called IXIA
PerfectStorm is used to generate both benign and anomalous data from three different
servers to different clients on 2 different networks mimicking attacks from the world
wide web. Two of the servers are used to send benign data, and one server is used to send

32

anomalous data. Traffic from the servers to the LANs pass through a firewall device. The
attacks are detected and labelled by using a combination of Bro-IDS and Argus IDS.
The UNSW-NB15 version in the UQ-NIDS-v2 (called NF-UNSW-NB15) varies
from the original dataset, in terms of amount of data. A distribution of data for the NFUNSW-NB15 version is provided. The tools used to simulate the attacks are not specified
in [31], therefore the mechanics of each attack subclass is unknown.
Class
Count
Benign
2,295,222
Fuzzers
22,310
Analysis
2,299
Backdoor
2,169
DoS
5,794
Exploits
31,551
Generic
16,560
Reconnaissance 12,779
Shellcode
1,427
Worms
164
Table 5 — Distribution of attacks in NF-UNSW-NB15
3.2.2.2. NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018
The CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset [32] is among the newest datasets available for
IDS research. This dataset was generated with major emphasis on representation of
modern generic corporate network architectures and modern attacks.
This network is entirely hosted over Amazon Web Services (AWS). Six networks with a
total of 420 machines and 30 servers is used to represent a realistic institutional network
and one network is used to represent a group of attackers with 50 machines. Each
underlying network represents a department, such as information technology, server
hosting, research and development, etc. The devices in each network have a variety of
different operating systems. The operating systems vary from Windows 8.1, 10 or
Windows server 2012, 2016 as well as Ubuntu systems. A custom software was used to
generate benign traffic in the network.
The traffic data was extracted using a software application called CICFlowMeter
by the Canadian Institute of Cybersecurity at the University of New Brunswick. There are
approximately 19 million flows where 88% of the data is benign and the remaining 12%
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is anomalous in the original dataset. The distribution of attacks in the UQ-NIDS-v2
version (NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018) varies from the original. The breakdown of NF-CSECIC-IDS2018 attacks, counts tools is provided.
Class

Count

Benign

16,635,567 -

Tool

Target OSI Layer

Target
Protocol

-

FTP
Brute Force
120,912
Patator
7
SSH
Botnet
143,097
Ares
7
Hulk
7
HTTP
GoldenEye 7
HTTP
DoS
483,999
Slowloris
7
HTTP
Slowhttptest 7
HTTP
HOIC
7
HTTP
DDoS
139,0270
LOIC
7
HTTP
Infiltration
116,361
Nmap
4
TCP/UDP
Web Attacks
3,502
Custom
7
Table 6 — Distribution of attacks in NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018, description of attack tool
3.2.2.3. NF-ToN-IoT
The ToN-IoT dataset (2020) [33] aims to provide an IDS dataset for internet of
things (IoT) and industrial IoT (IIoT) networks. The testbed was designed to contain
three principal layers: edge, fog and cloud layers. The devices in the edge layer are
sensors which collect real world data, VMWare servers, routers, switches, and
entertainment devices like smartphones or a smart TV. The fog layer contains a series of
different virtualization servers to provide computing capacity physically near the edge
layer. These provide different services for the overall network, such as the Node Red
service server which generates benign IoT sensor traffic. In this layer, there are 10 hacked
Kali Linux systems that run various Bash and Python scripts to exploit vulnerabilities.
The cloud layer represents a large size data centre with high computational and storage
capacity. Various services in this layer are running such as a website, an IoT hub and
HIVE-MQTT (a service management platform for IoT systems). Bro-IDS is used to
capture traffic data and generate features. The attacks distribution and tools is provided
for NF-ToN-IoT.
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Class

Count

Tool

Target OSI Layer

Benign
Backdoor

Target
Protocol
-

6,099,469 16,809
Custom
7
Custom Python
Script using Scapy
3
IP
DoS
712,609
Library
UFONet
7
HTTP
Custom Python
Script using Scapy
3
IP
DDoS
2,026,234
Library
UFONet
7
HTTP
Injection
684,465
Custom
7
MITM
7,723
Ettercap
2
ARP
Password
1,153,323 CeWL
7
Ransomware 3,425
7
Nmap
4
TCP/UDP
Scanning
3,781,419
Nessus
7
XSS
2,455,020 XSSer
7
HTTP
Table 7 — Distribution of attacks in NF-ToN-IoT, with attack tools
3.2.2.4. NF-BoT-IoT
The BoT-IoT dataset (2019) [34] aims to provide a dataset for scenarios where
IoT networks are targeted by Botnet attacks. A Node Red service server is used to
connect IoT devices with backend cloud servers. In this testbed setup, a script is run to
generate IoT sensor data from temperature, pressure, and humidity sensors. These sensors
are used to simulate five different IoT scenarios; a weather station, a smart fridge, motion
activated lights, a garage door, and a smart thermostat. These scenarios are hosted on 5
different machines. Benign traffic is generated using the Ostinato tool. The attacks are
executed by four different virtual machines (VMs) running Kali Linux and mimic a
botnet. The attack distribution of the UQ-NIDS-2 version (NF-BoT-IoT) is provided.
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Class

Count

Tool

Target OSI Layer Target Protocol

Benign

135,037

-

-

-

Xprobe2

4

TCP

Hping3

4

TCP

nmap

4

TCP/UDP

Hping3

4

TCP

Reconnaissance 2,620,999

DDoS

18,331,847

DoS

16,673,183

Theft

2,431

GoldenEye 7

HTTP

Hping3

TCP

4

GoldenEye 7

HTTP

Metasploit

-

-

Table 8 — Distribution of attacks in NF-BoT-IoT, with description of attack tool
3.2.3. Attack Tools
Each individual dataset has a unique suite of tools used to simulate network
attacks. This section will discuss functional differences between these tools for different
attack types. Discussion of custom or undocumented tools used in these datasets, or any
attacks in the NF-UNSW-NB15 dataset is not included. In addition, NetFlow samples
from attacks from the NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset will be included, as this is the only
dataset with labelled tools.
3.2.3.1. DoS/DDoS
In each UQ-NIDS-v2 subset, DoS/DDoS compose most of the attacks. In total,
there are 8 well known DoS/DDoS tools used between the three datasets. The name of the
tools as well as a brief description of how each tools performs, provided in Table 10.
A NetFlow data sample of DoS/DDoS attacks in the NF-CIC-CSE-IDS2018
dataset is shown in Table 9. Notice that except for SlowHTTPTest and Ares, all target
ports are port TCP/UDP 80, which is the main designated HTTP port. Each attack
operates in a similar manner, where a large volume of requests is sent to a server, and the
connection is maintained as long as possible by the attacker. This can be reflected in the
IN_PKTS, OUT_PKTS, DURATION_IN, DURATION_OUT, TCP_WIN_MAX_IN and
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TCP_WIN_MAX_OUT features. DoS/DDoS attacks of this nature will ideally maximize
each of these features.
The only exceptions are LOIC, HOIC and Ares attacks. LOIC will only spam a
server with GET requests, and short responses are returned. This can be reflected in the
DURATION_OUT feature. HOIC sends and receives data in very short bursts, which is
different compared the other DoS/DDoS attacks like HULK, GoldenEye, SlowHTTPTest
and SlowLoris. On a data level, Ares appears like LOIC. In conclusion, HOIC, LOIC and
Ares are different compared to the other DoS/DDoS tools, and an IDS will not be able to
detect this type of attack if it is not included in its training data.
L4_DST
_PORT
80
80
80
80
21

IN_PKTS
27
5
5
12
7

OUT_
PKTS
25
5
4
8
7

DURATION
_IN
281
3
32
890
94

DURATION
_OUT
234
3
0
875
94

TCP_WIN_
MAX_IN
26883
65535
8192
26883
26883

TCP_WIN_
MAX_OUT
26847
26883
26883
26847
0

80
8080

15
5

3
5

16
0

16
0

26883
8192

1024
26883

Tool
HULK
HOIC
LOIC
GoldenEye
SlowHTTPT
est
Slowloris
Ares

Table 9 — NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018-v2 data samples for DoS/DDoS attacks
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Tool

Description

HTTP Unbearable Load
King (HULK) [35]

HULK vigorously sends HTTP requests to target web servers to
overwhelm them. A HULK flood tries to make the payload
pattern in each request unique to evade IDS and IPS devices.
GoldenEye is a HTTP flooding tool to spam web servers with a

GoldenEye [36]

large amount of HTTP requests and to keep those connections
alive for as long as possible.
Slowloris is a HTTP attack that open multiple connections with
a targeted webserver and occasionally sends a partial request

Slowloris [37]

header to keep the connections open. Since the targeted
webserver is unable to release any of the connections, its
resources are consumed and unable to open new connections.
SlowHTTPTest is a tool included in Kali Linux, and works in a

Slowhttptest [38]

similar manner to Slowloris, where multiple HTTP connections
are opened and are maintained for as long as possible to
consume web server resources.

High Orbit Ion Cannon

HOIC is a successor to LOIC, where it spams target servers with

(HOIC) [39]

junk HTTP GET and POST requests.
LOIC is a JavaScript tool that floods servers with either TCP,

Low Orbit Ion Cannon

UDP or HTTP with junk data. The TCP and UDP modes send

(LOIC) [40]

meaningless message strings to devices at a specified target port,
while the HTTP mode spams GET requests.
UFONet targets HTTP webservers. It operates as a botnet,

UFONet [41]

where it exploits open redirect vectors on third party web
applications to redirect users to the targeted webserver.

Hping3 [42]
Ares [43]

Hping3 is a command line tool in Kali Linux to ping devices
using either TCP, UDP, ICMP or raw IP protocols.
A malware run on Android based devices to hijack the devices
processing power for botnet purposes.

Table 10 — Known DoS/DDoS tools used in the NF-UQ-NIDS-v2 dataset
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3.2.3.2. Probe
Probe attacks represent the second largest attack type in each UQ-NIDS-v2
dataset. The most common tool used in the underlying datasets, and in the cyber security
industry, for a probe attack is nmap (Network Mapper). Other alternatives of this tool
exist but are less commonly used.
Tool

Description

Network

A utility to scan large networks to discover hosts in a network and

Mapper

their associated system information (applications, operating system,

(nmap) [44]

packet filters and firewalls, etc.)
Hping3 is a command line tool in Kali Linux to ping devices using

Hping3 [42]

either TCP, UDP, ICMP or raw IP protocols.
A proprietary software for vulnerability assessment which can detect

Nessus [45]

vulnerabilities such as opportunities for privilege access escalation,
default passwords and misconfigurations.

Xprobe2 [46]

An OS fingerprinting tool that relies on fuzzy signature matching,
probabilistic guessing, multiple matching, and a signature database.

Table 11 — Known probe tools used in the NF-UQ-NIDS-v2 dataset
The operation of a probe attack from a NetFlow perspective is seen in Table 12. A
single packet is sent to a server as ping, and the server will reply. The servers reply will
confirm the devices IP address, open/closed ports, applications used, etc. Since datasets
using Hping3, Nessus and Xprobe2 do not have the tools labelled with the corresponding
data, it is difficult to the differentiate different tools manually.
L4_DST_
PORT
53
5087
25

IN_
PK
TS
1
1
1

OUT_PKTS

DURATION_
IN

DURATION_
OUT

TCP_WIN_
MAX_IN

TCP_WIN_
MAX_OUT

Tool

1
5
1

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
1024
1024

0
0
0

nmap
-

Table 12 — NF-UQ-NIDS-v2 data samples of probe attacks

39

3.2.3.3. Miscellaneous
The attacks in this section are all the remaining attack tools, which might not be
shared in each of the underlying UQ-NIDS-v2 dataset. These attacks and tools represent
the minority attack data. None of the datasets explicitly label which data belongs to
which tools, thus samples of data for each tool cannot be provided.
Tool

Attack Type

Description
A brute force application designed specifically for

Patator
[47]

BruteForce

password guessing. Its able to password guess on a
variety of different applications such as FTP, SSH,
Telnet, SMTP, SQL, etc.

Ettercap
[48]

MITM

A software with a suite of tools to perform MITM
attacks.
A Ruby application that will generate a list of words

CeWL

BruteForce

[49]

from a specified website for Jack the Ripper, a
different password cracking software.
A parallelized password cracker with a suite of

Hydra

BruteForce

[50]

different tools. It can be used on a multitude of
different protocols like HTTP, csv, FTP, Cisco AAA,
SMPT, SQL, etc.

XSSer

XSS

[51]
metasploit
[52]

A framework to detect and exploit XSS vulnerabilities
in web applications.
A proprietary cybersecurity tool which can detect

Theft

vulnerabilities in a network, and hijack a device via
command line shell, web application, etc.

Table 13 — Miscellaneous tools used in the NF-UQ-NIDS-v2 dataset.
3.3.

Basic Preprocessing Pipeline
Before introducing the dataset into a machine learning model, basic preprocessing

must be completed. This preprocessing entails sanitizing the data for faulty values like
null/not a number (NaN) and infinite values. Rows containing such values are dropped
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from the dataset immediately. It is also ensured that each row of data has a corresponding
correct label and attack category. The sanitized version of each individual dataset is then
saved and stored for further preprocessing. A custom preprocessing notebook is
developed to generate the train, validation, and testing files. The scope of operation of
this custom script includes:
1. Loading data with selected features
2. Balance training datasets to desired benign/anomaly ratios
3. Balance anomaly subclass distributions
4. Split training and validation data (DNN Only)
5. Generate a test set from leftover, unused data
6. Scale training, validation and test sets using Scikit-learn Standard Scaler (zero
mean and unit variance scaling)
7. Save datasets to a file
There are multiple reasons for development of a custom preprocessing notebook. First
and foremost, the size of the entire NF-UQ-NIDS-v2 dataset is roughly 13 GB. The
device being used has 16 GB of RAM, where 5GB is being used to run other
applications. The device is not able to load the entire dataset thus, a custom notebook is
created to preprocess the data in a computationally efficient manner. Secondly, utilization
of a custom preprocessing notebook allows for total control and insight of the data being
used. Using the Scikit-learn train_test_split function for instance, does not allow control
of selecting anomaly subclass distributions. In addition, it would require the entire dataset
to be loaded into the computers RAM.
Regarding the preprocessing pipeline, there are few important details to note. From
the four total datasets in NF-UQ-NIDS-v2, one is selected as the final evaluation set
(dataset D), and the remaining three (datasets A, B, C) are combined to serve as the
training, validation, and test sets. Dataset D represents the target network the IDS is to be
implemented on. It’s general network use and attacks contained within the dataset are
separate from the other datasets. Thus, the IDS is trained on NetFlow data from foreign
networks (datasets A, B, C), and evaluated on the target network (dataset D). A validation
set is only generated for DNN and not RF since the RF uses cross validation.
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The input to the preprocessing algorithm is the four NF-UQ-NIDS-v2 underlying
datasets, A, B, C (used for training, validation, and testing) and dataset D (the final
evaluation set). If generating data for a DNN, the output is 12 Numpy files. If generating
data for a RF, the output is 10 files.
File Name

Description

X_train.npy

Input data for model training

X_val.npy

Input data for validation during model training (DNN only)

X_test.npy

Input data for testing trained model

y_train.npy

Output labels for model training

y_val.npy

Output labels for validation during model training (DNN only)

y_test.npy

Output labels for testing trained model

X_1.npy

Input data for final evaluation (dataset D)

X_1_ar.numpy Input data for final evaluation (dataset D), with attacks removed
Output labels for final evaluation (dataset D), corresponding to

y_1.npy

X_1.npy

y_1_ar.npy

Output labels for final evaluation (dataset D), corresponding to
X_1_ar.npy

a_1.npy

Attack Category Labels, corresponding to X_1.npy and y_1.npy

a_1_ar.npy

Attack Category Labels, corresponding to X_1.npy and y_1.npy

Table 14 — Output files and description of preprocessing pipeline
3.3.1. The Unbalanced Dataset Problem
The focus of the section is section is to discuss the preprocessing steps used to
address the unbalanced nature of IDS datasets.
3.3.1.1. Training Set Balancing
To generate training, validation, and test sets, two primary factors are considered,
the ratio of benign data to total data and the distribution of attack subclasses.
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Benign Data to Total Dataset (r) Ratio

𝑟 =

𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠

=

𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑠

(3.1)

This metric considers the percentage of benign data relative to the entire dataset.
This metric can be described by equation 3.1. This ratio is critical to the performance of
the IDS, as it introduces a bias to the model and incorrectly choosing this ratio makes the
model prone to the data shift problem. Data shift is the scenario where the distribution of
classes between the models’ training data and test data varies greatly, which will
negatively impact the model’s performance on the testing data [53]. In practical
scenarios, the ratio of benign to attack data is continuously changing. To address this, an
assumption is made to choose this ratio that will reflect an approximate bias in the model.
This ratio will likely vary on a case-to-case basis, depending on the model or chosen
machine learning algorithm. Some networks may experience more network attacks than
others, and some machine learning algorithms may need the bias. The benign samples
that are selected are chosen at random.
Attack Subclass Distribution
The distribution of each attack type and tool in the training data play an important
role for a successful IDS model. An algorithm is developed to sample attacks in a manner
that satisfies the r ratio, and the selected attack distribution represents that of the original
datasets. The largest attack distributions in each UQ-NIDS-v2 subsets are DoS/DDoS and
probe. Therefore, these two attack types are well represented in the training data and are
reflective to that of the attack distribution in the final evaluation data. The remaining
attacks in the training data are the miscellaneous attacks which are unique to each dataset.
The training, validation set generation process iterates through datasets A, B, C,
and they are sampled individually. The sampled attack subclass distributions are
proportional to the attack subclass distribution in each of the original training datasets.
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3.3.1.2. Training, Validation, Test Split
The training set and validation sets are separated using a custom function. The
validation set contains the exact same distributions of benign and anomalous subclasses
as in the training set. The sampled validation data is removed from the training set.
Once the training and validation sets are generated, a file is created containing all
the leftover data not used in the training/validation sets. The same algorithm used to
generate the training set is used to create the testing set, but on this leftover data file. The
r ratio is configurable to increase or decrease the benign data in the test set. The attack
subclass distribution reflects the distribution of attacks in the original leftover file.
3.3.2. Benign Data Training Set Scenarios
In practical IDS implementations, attack data collection is a constraint. However,
this is not the case for benign data, as benign data is abundant because a majority of
network traffic is benign. Therefore, the natural benign traffic of the IDS target network
can be mixed with the attack data from a foreign network. The developed machine
learning models are trained two times on two versions the training data. The training set
versions are denoted as: Original Benign Original Anomaly (OBOA) and Replaced
Benign Original Anomaly (RBOA). The purpose of these training scenarios is to analyze
the IDS understanding of benign data between different networks. A flowchart of how
these training sets is generated is provided.
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Figure 9 — Generation of training, validation, test set variants.
The attack data in the training, validation, and test sets between OBOA and
RBOA are the exact same, the only difference being the benign data. In addition, the
evaluation sets between the two scenarios contain the exact same data. The only
difference between the two is their scaling, they are scaled relative to their training sets.
3.3.2.1. Original Benign Original Anomaly (OBOA)
The data in the OBOA training set is 100% from foreign networks (datasets A, B,
C). The data in this set is a compilation of data from other networks with absolutely no
connection to that of the evaluation set (dataset D). The configuration, use and
applications of the IDS target network is almost entirely different than the data from a
foreign network.
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Anomalous
data from
foreign
networks
Benign data
from foreign
networks

Figure 10 — Example of distribution of benign data for OBOA training set
3.3.2.2. Replaced Benign Original Anomaly (RBOA)
The benign data in the RBOA training set is 100% from the IDS target network –
the network the IDS is to be implemented on. The benign data is borrowed and removed
from the evaluation set. Removal is to ensure no identical duplicates exist between
training and evaluation data. Ultimately, the contents of this training set are composed of
the benign data of the network which the IDS is to be implemented on, and the
anomalous attack data from foreign networks (datasets A, B, C). The attack data is an
exact copy of the OBOA set attacks. Only the benign data is removed and replaced. The
reason to keeping the exact same attacks is to ensure both versions of the model learn the
exact same attacks. The model trained twice on the OBOA and RBOA datasets then may
be fairly compared. The validation and test sets also a borrow a small portion of the final
evaluation set data. If there is not enough data left to borrow, SMOTE is used to fulfil the
remaining samples.
Anomalous
data from
foreign
networks
Benign data from target
network

Figure 11 — Example of distribution of benign data for RBOA training set, where the
benign data is replaced solely from the test set
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3.3.3. Attacks Removed (AR) Evaluation Dataset
After the evaluation dataset is scaled and saved to a file, an alternate version of it
is processed. This alternate version of the evaluation set is the exact copy of the original
evaluation set, except selected attacks are removed. There are two purposes for this
evaluation set.
With the attacks removed, the r ratio increases, where the distribution of benign
data increases. By testing the trained model on this version of the evaluation set, the
effect of dataset shift can be analyzed to see the model’s performance on a different
distribution of benign data. The metric of interest is FPs. This information may be used
to tune the model, or to generate a new training dataset with a different r ratio.
The distribution of attack subclasses is unbalanced, meaning some attacks have a
greater influence on the model’s evaluation metrics than others. An attack in the
evaluation set which is unique and has zero representation in the training data will most
likely be undetected by the trained IDS. For a fair evaluation of the IDS, these attacks are
removed for this version of the evaluation dataset.
From a practical perspective, the method of model evaluation may vary on the
requirements of the network. For example, if a network contains a signature IDS, and a
firewall that both struggle to detect a certain attack, then an anomaly IDS can be trained
to detect that certain attack, and the dataset of interest for evaluation would only contain
benign data and the attack of interest, like the AR dataset. On the other hand, if an IDS is
built to maximize the detection rate on random attacks, even attacks the IDS is not trained
on, then the dataset of interest is the full evaluation dataset, containing all attacks.
3.3.4. Feature Selection
Feature selection is a critical preprocessing step to have a successful IDS. Many
works exist applying different feature selection algorithms and mechanisms on IDS
datasets to optimize IDS performance.
In this thesis work, features are selected based on manual analysis. A minimal
number of features are selected to reduce model complexity and to hasten training and
prediction time. The features chosen are selected based on the following criteria:
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1. Features with a noticeably strong correlation with a specific attack. The primary
focus for this criterion is DoS/DDoS attacks because of their high volume in the
datasets. However, other attacks are additionally considered.
2. Feature representation in the TCP/IP or OSI models. Since different attacks target
different protocols on the TCP/IP stack, it is important to have visibility of what is
occurring on each layer. Some attacks target specific protocols on different layers.
For instance, a DDoS attack spamming Internet Control Message Protocol
(ICMP) varies from a DDoS attack vigorously spamming HTTP requests. For the
former, inspection of transport layer data and above will not show any obvious
hints of a cyber-attack.
3.

Features with the probability of randomness or containing arbitrary values are not
included. For example, TCP and UDP ports are dynamic/unassigned between the
ranges of 49152 and 65535. Most anomalous and benign data in L4_SRC_PORT
feature in each dataset is dynamic ports. It is unknown what application is used on
the cyber attackers’ devices, and therefore, the source port values can be
considered arbitrary and not useful.

3.4.

Model Training
This section focuses on the implementation of the chosen machine learning

algorithms, including a brief explanation why the algorithm is selected, and an analysis
on the different factors and tools considered in the models training process.
3.4.1. Deep Neural Networks
Deep learning offers several advantages for IDS. The nature of the problem
explored in this thesis revolves around combining an extremely diverse set of data to train
an IDS. Given the large variety of existing attacks, a large volume of data is required to
sufficiently cover a wide scope of attacks. Thus, IDSs require a large dataset. Deep
learning can understand large, diverse, and complicated data. In addition, deep learning
can autonomously perform feature engineering. Lastly, deep learning has a quick
prediction time for tabular data, meaning the IDS can scan through traffic in real time. In
this thesis, classical DNNs are utilized as opposed to other DNN variants (CNN, RNN,
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etc.) to minimize preprocessing overhead computation if implemented in a practical
environment. Other DNN variants require additional preprocessing steps, such as
converting the tabular nature of the data to an image for CNN, or to a sentence format for
RNN.
In terms of DNN architecture, several different architectures are experimented
and evaluated with, specifically number of hidden layers and the number of neurons in
each layer. The activation functions do not change between any tested model. Each
model uses ReLU activations in hidden layer neurons, and the output layer is a single
node with a sigmoid activation function.
The Adam optimizer is used throughout this entire thesis. Different learning rates
are experimented with. If the initial learning rates do not immediately decrease the loss
function, then training restarted with a lower learning rate. The chosen loss function is
BCE, as it is built to optimize problems of this nature - binary classification. The batch
size used in the model varies from model to model.
Two Keras callback tools are used during the model training, Reduce Learning
Rate On Plateau (RLROP) and Early Stopping (ES). RLROP actively monitors a specific
metric in either the training or validation set through each epoch. Depending on the
metric, if it does not improve after a specified number of epochs, the learning rate will be
reduced by a specified factor. In this project, RLROP is configured to monitor the
validation loss. The factor to decrease the learning rate is 10, and the number of epochs
before reducing the learning rate is dependent on the model. Next, the ES callback stops
model training when a specified metric does not improve after a specified number of
epochs to prevent overfitting and to save time. The number of epochs chosen before
stopping is always greater than the specified epochs for RLROP, to prevent the training
from stopping before the learning rate is reduced. Typically, the ES epochs is roughly
double the RLROP epochs.
In each neural network, a dropout rate of 50% is used in between each layer
during training. Dropout drops a specified fraction of weights randomly in a specified
layer during training to reduce the chance of overfitting the data. Without dropout, the
DNN will overfit the data, thus dropout is always used.
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Lastly, the final tool used to assist the neural network during training is class
weights. The training data for DNN in this thesis is unbalanced. Because of the
unbalanced nature of the training data, class weights are assigned to inform the model of
the existing class imbalance, and to allow the minority class to have a bigger impact
while training the model. This is achieved by severely penalizing the cost function if it
misclassifies the minority class. This is called cost sensitive learning.
3.4.2. Random Forest
RF is a suitable machine learning algorithm for IDS use. It can handle large
datasets efficiently, automatically handle missing values, and perform automatic feature
selection.
The Scikit-learn library RandomForestClassifer is used. This RF can perform
reasonably well without any configuration, however hyperparameter tuning may be used
to improve classifier results. There are five key hyperparameters of interest: number of
estimators, maximum number of features, maximum depth, minimum samples split and
minimum samples in a leaf.
The number of estimators refers to the number of decision trees to be trained in
the random forest. For binary classification problems, the number of trees boosts
performance, but this gain is most significant within the first 500 trees. [54]. Performance
will keep increasing with more trees, but the overall increase is negligible after 250.
Thus, the range of trees is kept from 250 to 500 trees.
The maximum number of features is a hyperparameter that decides the maximum
number of features to consider splitting a node. This is the factor that decides the m
features in Algorithm 1. Scikit-learn offers a variety of different methods to calculate this
parameter such as considering the square root of total features or using a logarithm with
base 2. This is determined using trial and error.
The maximum depth hyperparameter controls the maximum number of layers
within each decision tree. From experimentation, a large maximum depth results in
overfitting the dataset. The optimal range for maximum depth must be determined from
experimentation.
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The minimum samples split specifies the total minimum number of samples to
split an internal node inside a decision tree. This hyperparameter coincides with
minimum samples in a leaf, where it dictates the minimum number of samples required to
generate a leaf node in the decision tree. Both these values are determined
experimentally.

Figure 12 — Grid Search vs Random Search
As many of these hyperparameters are determined experimentally, random search
will be used to determine the best models. Random search is method that will test a
variety of different models using a random value for each specified hyper parameter via
cross validation. An alternative to random search is grid search. Grid search scans
through every hyperparameter to determine the optimal model. Grid search can determine
the best possible model to use for a problem, but it is extremely computationally
expensive and time consuming. Random search is a more efficient method to determine
optimal hyperparameters with almost equally good results [55].
3.5.

Evaluation
Two experiments are used to determine IDS transferability when trained on data

from foreign networks. The two experiments use both DNN and RF. The redundancy of
repeating these two experiments with different machine learning algorithm re-enforces
and verifies the results. In both experiments, the IDS is trained on data from foreign
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networks, and evaluated on the target network dataset. Each network associated with each
dataset is completely independent from each other.
3.5.1. Experiment 1 – Transferability of Benign and Anomalous Data
In this experiment, two IDSs are trained, one on the OBOA set and the other on
the RBOA set. Both IDS machine learning models use the exact same architecture,
hyperparameters, configuration. After training, if the OBOA IDS performs well on the
test set, then both IDSs are evaluated on the AR evaluation set. Then the results can be
compared, and the impact of training data used can be analyzed.
The transferability of anomalous data is decided by observing the detected attacks
in the AR evaluation set for OBOA, RBOA IDSs. If the IDSs can clearly differentiate a
large sum of TPs while simultaneously being able to identify a large sum of TNs, then the
anomalous data is transferable. More specifically, the recall/sensitivity and specificity
must be adequate. The recall is consulted to witness whether most attacks are detected,
and the specificity is used verify the recall and to ensure that not all predictions are
anomalous. Precision is not factor for the transferability of anomalous data, as this
involves analysis and optimization for the transferability of benign data.
The transferability of benign data may only be concluded if anomalous data is
transferable. If the anomalous data is transferable, then the precision in both OBOA,
RBOA scenarios is consulted. By comparing the precision of both OBOA, RBOA IDSs,
it will be clear whether an IDS trained on foreign network benign data will yield as good
results as an IDS trained on target network benign data. Failure to demonstrate
transferability will yield in an extremely low precision, a high volume of false alarms.
As the transferability of anomalous data primarily involves consideration of the
recall, and transferability of benign data primarily involves consideration of precision, the
F1 score can be consulted for overall transferability/performance, as it summarizes the
two metrics in a single number.
3.5.2. Experiment 2 – IDS for Maximum Attack Coverage
The purpose of this experiment is to investigate the full potential of an IDS
trained on anomalous data from foreign networks. In practical scenarios, it is very likely
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for an IDS to face attacks which may be outside of the scope of attacks included in the
IDSs training data. Therefore, this experiment analyzes methods to stretch the scope of
the IDSs attack coverage.
This experiment trains an IDS on the best performing training set (OBOA,
RBOA) observed in experiment 1. The IDS is then evaluated on the full evaluation set,
which contains all attacks on the target network. The primary method used to stretch the
detection scope is by using threshold adjustment, via Youden’s J statistic on the ROC
curve. Models with a high AUC demonstrate the potential threshold adjustment to be
successful. The results of the model evaluating the full test set using the default threshold
is compared with the results using the optimal threshold. Models achieving a high AUC,
and high F1 score are considered successful for stretching attack coverage. Dissection of
detected attacks will primarily focus on the attacks not included in the AR evaluation set.
Other methods to stretch attack coverage like feature selection is explored.
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Chapter 4 — Simulation & Results
4.1.

Evaluation Dataset
The NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset is selected as the target network. The foreign

networks for the training sets are NF-ToN-IoT, NF-BoT-IoT and NF-UNSW-NB15. The
NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018 dataset is chosen as the evaluation set because of its abundance of
benign data, allowing for minimal use of SMOTE for the RBOA training sets, and the
tools used to simulate each attack are clearly labelled, which gives clear indication of
which tools/attacks the IDS struggles to detect for interpretability evaluation.
4.1.1. Overlapping Attacks
In total, there are five overlapping general attack categories between the training set and
the evaluation set. However, the training and evaluation set only share two exact attack
tools: Golden Eye for DoS/DDoS attacks and nmap for network probe. The tools for the
remaining common attacks, XSS, brute force and SQL Injection, are custom, therefore
their similarity unknown.
The AR evaluation set removes attacks using the following tools: HOIC, LOIC and
Botnet (Ares). These attacks are removed based on testing dozens of different models on
this data. None of the models can identify any of those attacks for either OBOA, RBOA
scenarios using all features. The only exception is LOIC, where strict feature selection
must be used, or using an adjusted threshold. Thus, the AR evaluation set will only
contain attacks which can be detected by the IDS using the default threshold. The
removal of these attacks can be verified by manually analyzing the data, as discussed in
3.2.3.1. It is possible these attacks cannot be detected because, they are not transferable
due to network configurations, or there is no similarly between those tools and the tools
used in the training data.
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•
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DoS/DDoS
MITM
XSS
Worms
Shellcode
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Ransomware
Theft
Fuzzers
Backdoor
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•
•

DDoS - HOIC, LOIC
Botnet

Common Attacks
•
•
•
•
•

DoS/DDoS
Probe - nmap
XSS
SQL Injection
Brute force

Figure 13 — Estimated overlapping attacks in the NF-CSECIC-IDS2018 dataset and training data
4.2.

Deep Neural Networks
This section includes all the work done with DNN. First, the details about the

preprocessing stage are discussed, followed by results and analysis of both experiments 1
and 2.
4.2.1. Dataset Preprocessing
This section provides tallies/distributions of OBOA, RBOA training, validation,
test, and evaluation sets, and lists the selected features with reasoning for selection.
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4.2.1.1. Training, Validation, Test and Evaluation Sets
The distribution of training data from the foreign networks is seen in Table 15.
The main objective in terms of attack distribution in the training set is to include as much
of a diverse variety of attacks as possible. The validation data is 12.5% the size of the
training data and contains the exact same distribution of benign and attack data. The test
data is generated from the remaining unused data after generating the training and
validation sets, which utilizes all the remaining unused benign data. The r ratio for the
training, validation, and test data 80%. The training/validation/test dataset generation
algorithm attempts to maximize the available data from each foreign network dataset,
depending on if they contain more benign data than attack data, and vice versa. The
composition of the OBOA training/validation data from the foreign network datasets is,
92.2% total data from NF-ToN-IoT, 5.7% total data from NF-UNSW-NB15, 2.0% total
data from NF-BoT-IoT. Therefore, 95.2% of the training data is from IoT networks. The
remaining 5.7% is from a similar network as the target network.
The OBOA and RBOA training sets contain the exact same attack data, and exact
same attack category distributions. The only difference between the two is the benign
data, where the benign data in OBOA sets stem from the foreign network datasets, and
the benign data in the RBOA sets stems from the target network. There is no
overlapping/duplicate benign data between the RBOA training, validation, test, and
evaluation sets. In addition, around half of the benign data in both the RBOA test and
validation sets is generated using SMOTE. SMOTE is performed separately on both sets.
Both evaluation sets for OBOA and RBOA cases are the same and contain the
exact same data. The only difference between the two is the scaling. The OBOA
evaluation sets are scaled to the OBOA training data, and the RBOA evaluation sets are
scaled to the RBOA training data. The original NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018 contains
16,635,567 benign samples, but the evaluation sets contain 10,020,849 total benign
samples. The removed benign samples are used for the RBOA sets. Keeping the number
of benign samples constant between OBOA and RBOA evaluation sets allows for clear
and equal comparison between scenarios.
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Training Data
Validation Data
Test Data
Attack
Count
%
Count
%
Count
%
Probe
480728
6.6%
68584
6.6%
59888
2.5%
Backdoor
3969
0.1%
566
0.1%
147
0.0%
Benign
5787878 80.0%
826840
80.0%
1915010
80.0%
DoS/DDoS
369499
5.1%
52938
5.1%
380945
15.9%
Exploits
27637
0.4%
3914
0.4%
0
0.0%
Fuzzers
19452
0.3%
2858
0.3%
0
0.0%
Generic
14465
0.2%
2095
0.2%
0
0.0%
Shellcode
1241
0.0%
186
0.0%
0
0.0%
Worms
144
0.0%
20
0.0%
0
0.0%
Injection
84169
1.2%
12106
1.2%
6003
0.3%
MITM
951
0.0%
135
0.0%
68
0.0%
Brute Force
141837
2.0%
20386
2.0%
10115
0.4%
Ransomware
415
0.0%
67
0.0%
30
0.0%
XSS
302461
4.2%
42855
4.1%
21531
0.9%
Sum
7,234,846 100% 1,033,550
100% 2,393,737
100%
Table 15 — Distribution of training, validation, and test data for OBOA and RBOA sets
Full Evaluation
AR Evaluation
Count
%
Count
%
10,020,849
81.6% 10,020,849
93.3%
143,097
1.2%
0
0.0%
2,143
0.0%
2,143
0.0%
927
0.0%
927
0.0%
1,080,858
8.8%
0
0.0%

Attack
Benign
Bot
Brute Force -Web
Brute Force -XSS
DDOS attack-HOIC
DDOS attack-LOICUDP
2,112
0.0%
0
0.0%
DDoS attacks-LOICHTTP
307,300
2.5%
0
0.0%
DoS attacks-GoldenEye
27,723
0.2%
27,723
0.3%
DoS attacks-Hulk
432,648
3.5%
432,648
4.0%
DoS attacksSlowHTTPTest
14,116
0.1%
14,116
0.1%
DoS attacks-Slowloris
9,512
0.1%
9,512
0.1%
FTP-BruteForce
25,933
0.2%
25,933
0.2%
Infiltration
116,361
0.9%
116,361
1.1%
SQL Injection
432
0.0%
432
0.0%
SSH-Bruteforce
94,979
0.8%
94,979
0.9%
Sum
12,278,990
100.0% 10,745,623
100.0%
Table 16 — Distribution of evaluation sets for OBOA and RBOA scenarios
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4.2.1.2. Feature Selection
For deep learning, an intuitive approach is used for feature selection. The features
are selected with an emphasis based on detected DoS/DDoS attacks as they represent
most attacks in the evaluation dataset. An explanation for each selected feature is
provided.
Feature

Explanation

L4_DST_PORT

Provides insight on Transport Layer
activities.

PROTOCOL

Provides insight on Network Layer
activities.

L7_PROTOCOL

Provides insight on Application Layer
activities.

IN_BYTES

Demonstrates how much data is being
sent to the network.

FLOW_DURATION_MILLISECONDS Demonstrates how long the connection
is being kept alive in total. Most
DoS/DDoS attacks will maximize this
feature.
DURATION_IN

Demonstrates the time being spent for
the server to receive data from client.
All DoS/DDoS attacks maximize this
feature.

TCP_WIN_MAX_IN

Maximum size of TCP window to
server. Most DoS/DDoS attacks
maximize this feature to keep the
connection alive for as long as possible.

TCP_WIN_MAX_OUT

Maximum size of TCP window.
DoS/DDoS attacks and some probe
attacks maximize this feature.

Table 17— Selected Features with explanation
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A variety of other potentially useful features may also be included such as
OUT_BYTES, OUT_DURATION, IN_PKTS, OUT_PKTS. The features describing the
egress direction flows are omitted to identify LOIC attacks. The LOIC tool is unique,
where a minimal reply is sent from the server. None of the training data contains a
DoS/DDoS attack of this nature. By omitting this information from the IDS, LOIC
attacks appear as attacks in the training data to the IDS.
4.2.2. Experiment 1 – Transferability of Benign and Anomalous Data
The contents of this section dictate the architectures and hyperparameters of
selected models, and the simulation results alongside key takeaways.
4.2.2.1. Models
A summary of models and their hyper parameters is provided below. The models
under the model architecture column represent the hidden layers of the neural networks.
Each neural network uses the same tools such as RLROP, ES, class weights. Each neural
network uses the Adam optimizer, but the learning rates vary. The class weights are
consistent in each model, given by the Python dictionary {0:1, 1:5}. This dictionary
indicates a 1:5 ratio of anomalous to benign data to the model. RLROP decreases the
learning rate by a factor of 10 after the validation loss does not reach a new minimum
within a specified number of epochs from the last validation loss minimum. If there is
absolutely no improvement after a specified number of epochs from the last validation
minimum, ES will stop training all together. Lastly, dropout of 50% is used in each layer
for each model to avoid overfitting. No threshold adjustment is used in this experiment,
meaning that the default classification threshold of 0.5 is used.
In total, 10 models are trained, where two of each model in Table 18 is trained.
One version is trained on the OBOA training set, and the other is trained on the RBOA
training set. The results of each are evaluated on their corresponding OBOA or RBOA
test set, and on the AR evaluation sets.

59

Model

Learning

Batch

RLROP

ES

Trainable

Architecture

Rate

Size

Epochs

Epochs

Parameters

15_5_15_15_20_15 1e-4

64

5

9

1196

20_15_15_8

1e-4

256

5

10

872

20_15_15_15_8

1e-4

256

5

10

1112

60_30

1e-3

128

5

10

2401

64_64_64_64

1e-4

128

5

9

13121

Table 18 — Summary of hyperparameters for tested models
4.2.2.2. Results
To evaluate the transferability of attack data, the results from the models trained
on the OBOA training data is analyzed. Most OBOA models can detect some samples
from each category. Each OBOA model can detect a strong majority of DoS/DDoS
attacks, as well as brute force attacks over FTP. However, detection of the remaining
attacks varies by model. The remaining attacks are brute force attacks via SSH/Web/XSS,
SQL injection and probe attacks (infiltration).
Amongst the five models, the average recall is 0.81 and the average specificity is
0.65 on the OBOA AR evaluation set. This demonstrates the average model can interpret
81% of attacks on the target network and has a rough understanding of what traffic is
benign. As the model can predict 81% of attacks correctly while not have a severe bias
for predicting anomalies (correctly predict of 65% benign samples), it can be concluded
that anomalous data from other networks is transferrable for IDS training.
For transferability of benign data, both RBOA and OBOA IDS results are
analyzed. For OBOA, the average specificity and precision are 0.65 and 0.42. For
RBOA, the average specificity and precision are 0.99 and 0.91. Although the OBOA IDS
shows some understanding of benign data, its results are clearly inferior compared to the
RBOA IDS. The OBOA IDS can correctly classify 65% of benign data, and yield more
FPs than TPs, where 42% of attack predictions are correct. The average RBOA IDS is
superior by minimizing false positives and increasing specificity to 99%. The best
performing OBOA IDSs both have 99% specificity and 77%, 95% precision, which is
more comparable to the average RBOA IDS. However, the RBOA versions of the best
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OBOA IDSs perform better. Thus, a benign data from foreign networks is transferable for
IDS interpretation, but the IDS performance is heavily reliant on the model’s architecture
and hyperparameters. Using benign data from the target network relieves the burden on
choosing the optimal architecture an hyperparameters and certainly improves IDS
performance.
For overall performance, two different architectures stand out,
15_5_15_15_20_15 and 20_15_15_15_8. The OBOA versions of these models have
similar performance, but 15_5_15_15_20_15 has better overall performance reflected in
the F1 score (0.81 vs 0.77). The recalls are in similar range, but 15_5_15_15_20_15
performs a better job identifying benign data. Interestingly, the ranking between the two
swaps when analyzing RBOA version performance. 20_15_15_15_8 has an F1 score of
0.85 and 15_5_15_15_20_15 is 0.82. Both models perform generally better than their
OBOA versions. In addition, these models are no longer the best performing RBOA
models, and rank third (20_15_15_15) and fourth (15_5_15_15_20_15). The best
performing RBOA model is 64_64_64_64 with an F1 score of 0.88. This OBOA version
of this model performs poorly with an F1 score of 0.23. This demonstrates the impact of
using benign data from the target network versus foreign networks. Only 2 out of 5
OBOA models are feasible for network implementation, whereas all RBOA models can
realistically be used.
Since only 20_15_15_15_8 and 15_5_15_15_20_15 both performed well in the
OBOA scenario, their attack detections are compared between the scenarios. The attack
report for 20_15_15_15_8 is provided (Figure 14), where the OBOA version is on top,
and the RBOA version is at the bottom. The RBOA version has a higher recall and
precision compared to OBOA. The RBOA version can detect more SSH brute force
attacks and slightly more probe attacks, but it detects less DoS Slowloris attacks, far less
web brute force attacks, zero XSS brute force attacks and zero SQL injection attacks. The
scope of detection for the RBOA version is slightly narrower than the OBOA version.
But the detection of some brute force SSH attacks is boosted.
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Figure 14 — 20_15_15_15_8 attack report for OBOA (top) and RBOA (bottom) versions
On the other hand, the 15_5_15_15_20_15 attack report (Figure 15) shows no
trade-off between OBOA and RBOA versions of the model. The RBOA version is a full
improvement of OBOA. The RBOA version can detect all the same attacks as the OBOA
version, but slightly more in each category. The only attack not detected by either is SQL
injection.

62

Figure 15 — 15_5_15_15_20_15 attack report OBOA (top) and RBOA (bottom) versions
The difference between a working OBOA model and RBOA counterpart varies by
model architecture and hyperparameters. In both OBOA and RBOA scenarios, the IDS
model fails to identify an adequate number probe (infiltration) and XSS attacks. The
training data and evaluation data both use nmap to simulate probe attacks, and therefore
should theoretically be detected by the IDS. Also, the training data contains an ample
amount of probe data, with 6.6% total representation. The reason for this failure to detect
this attack reflects on the data. The distribution of nmap probe attacks may be
underrepresented, where perhaps a majority of attacks in the training data is HPing3 and
the two tools operation is not similar. Another reason is it may not be interpretable
between networks because of the network configuration. This is a similar case with XSS
and injection attacks.
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OBOA
Model

Metric

Test Set

RBOA
Evaluation

Test Set

Set (AR)

Evaluation
Set (AR)

15_5_15_15_20_

AUC

0.95

0.83

0.94

0.94

15

F1 Score

0.82

0.81

0.91

0.82

Precision

0.95

0.95

0.99

0.96

Recall

0.72

0.70

0.85

0.72

Specificity

0.99

0.99

0.99

0.99

AUC

0.92

0.84

0.99

0.89

F1 Score

0.45

0.18

0.94

0.78

Precision

0.30

0.11

0.96

0.86

Recall

0.94

0.80

0.92

0.71

Specificity

0.44

0.51

0.99

0.99

AUC

0.93

0.89

0.97

0.91

F1 Score

0.73

0.77

0.95

0.85

Precision

0.66

0.83

0.97

0.88

Recall

0.82

0.71

0.94

0.82

Specificity

0.90

0.99

0.99

0.99

AUC

0.95

0.83

0.99

0.94

F1 Score

0.55

0.14

0.95

0.86

Precision

0.39

0.07

0.97

0.90

Recall

0.97

0.96

0.93

0.82

Specificity

0.61

0.14

0.99

0.99

AUC

0.95

0.83

0.98

0.94

F1 Score

0.66

0.23

0.96

0.88

Precision

0.5

0.13

0.98

0.93

Recall

0.97

0.88

0.98

0.84

Specificity

0.76

0.60

0.99

0.99

20_15_15_8

20_15_15_15_8

60_30

64_64_64_64

Table 19 — Summary of results for OBOA and RBOA DNN models
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Test Set
Model

OBOA

RBOA

15_5_15_
15_20_15

20_15_15
_15_8

64_64_64
_64

Table 20 — Confusion matrices for the top three models on the test set
Table 20 shows the confusion matracies for the top three OBOA models on the
test set, and the results of the corresponding RBOA models on the RBOA test set. A clear
improvement in each model is evident, where for 15_5_15_15_20_15 and
20_15_15_15_8 the overall performance is improved in the RBOA models. For
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64_64_64_64, the recall is decreased, but the precision is significantly improved, which
is preferred. The other models, 60_30 and 20_15_15_8 also show drastic improvement in
the RBOA test set.
AR Evaluation Set
Model

OBOA

RBOA

15_5_15_15
_20_15

20_15_15_15_8

64_64_64_64

Table 21 — Confusion matrices for top three test set models on AR evaluation set
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The confusion matrices for the top three OBOA models in the test set phase on
the AR evaluation set, alongside their corresponding RBOA models results. OBOA
models that perform well on the OBOA test set, have good results on the AR evaluation
set. The RBOA version of these models boost the results on the AR evaluation set.
4.2.3. Experiment 2 – IDS for Maximum Attack Coverage
In this experiment the neural networks are tasked to detect attacks on the full
evaluation dataset. Analysis of how the IDSs reacts to new attacks that are different from
the attacks the IDS is trained on can be observed. This dataset contains all the original
NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018 attacks, including LOIC, HOIC and botnet attacks. Because of
this new data, it is incredibly challenging to develop an IDS with adequate performance.
To overcome this challenge and improve detection, the models are trained on the RBOA
training data and are evaluated on the RBOA scaled evaluation datasets. A variety of
different neural network architectures are tested but many of those neural networks failed
to detect the HOIC, LOIC and botnet attacks. Only the best architectures are included.
4.2.3.1. Models
Two architectures with their hyperparameters are shown in Table 22. Both neural
networks use the same tools as experiment 1. The Adam optimizer is used with a learning
rate of 1e-4. RLROP and ES are used as callbacks, and class weights are used given by
the python dictionary {0:1, 1:5}. This dictionary informs the neural network the dataset is
imbalanced, where the minority class is 20% of the total training data, so the loss
function is penalized heavily when a misclassification occurs during training. Dropout of
50% is used in each layer during training. The loss function used is binary cross entropy.
Model

Learning

Batch Size

RLROP

ES Epochs

Architecture

Rate

15_15_15_15

1e-4

256

5

10

871

15_15_15

1e-4

256

5

10

631

Epochs

Trainable
Parameters

Table 22 — Models and their hyperparameters for maximum detection
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4.2.3.2. Results
After training a model, the model is evaluated four times, twice on the full
evaluation set, and twice on the AR evaluation set, where for each evaluation set, two
different thresholds are tested. One threshold is the default threshold, 0.5, and the other
threshold is the optimal threshold for the full evaluation set. The optimal threshold is
selected using Youdens J statistic from the ROC curve.
The models are selected based on their AUC scores, which showcase the model’s
potential to perform. For unbalanced problems such as this, the AUC score is a popular
metric to use to judge a model’s performance. A comparison of ROC curves for the full
evaluation set is shown in Figure 16. Based on this graph and the AUC score, it is clear
15_15_15_15 has greater potential to perform on the full evaluation dataset when altering
the classification threshold.

Figure 16 — ROC Curves for models 15_15_15 and 15_15_15_15
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Model

Metric

-

Optimal Threshold

0.14

0.57

-

AUC

0.74

0.90

F1 Score

0.47

0.66

Precision

0.68

0.59

Recall

0.36

0.76

Specificity

0.96

0.96

# FPs

384,314

F1 Score

0.46

0.56

Precision

0.31

0.22

Recall

0.91

0.95

Specificity

0.54

0.54

# FPs

4,584,143

-

Optimal Threshold

0.20

0.56

-

AUC

0.88

0.87

F1 Score

0.36

0.58

Precision

0.50

0.47

Recall

0.28

0.76

Specificity

0.99

0.94

# FPs

628,887

F1 Score

0.78

0.56

Precision

0.73

0.44

Recall

0.84

0.77

Specificity

0.93

0.93

# FPs

716,179

0.5
15_15_15

0.14

0.5
15_15_15_15

0.20

Evaluation Set

Evaluation

Threshold

Table 23 — Summary of results for overall classification
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Set AR

Model

Threshold = 0.5

Threshold = Optimal Threshold

15_15_15

Optimal
Threshold =
0.14

15_15_15_15

Optimal
Threshold =
0.2

Table 24 — Comparison of DNN model performance with different thresholds.
15_15_15 with the default threshold shows satisfactory performance. It can detect
slightly above the expected scope of attacks. The additional detected attacks are LOIC
attacks. This is with the assistance of the feature selection scheme. When re-evaluating
the model on the full dataset using the optimal threshold, it can detect more attacks. All
SSH brute force and HOIC attacks are detected and significantly more LOIC, probe,
brute force via web, SQL injection and XSS attacks. However, this is at the expense of a
much lower precision, specificity.
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Figure 17 — Attack Classification Report for 15_15_15. Top is threshold of 0.5, bottom
is threshold of 0.14
The next tested neural network, 15_15_15_15 does not achieve better results
when using the default threshold but is the best performing model using a custom
threshold. Using the threshold of 0.5, the model can perform adequately on the expected
attacks. It can detect attacks of each category, except for botnet. It can detect a small
amount of LOIC, HOIC attacks. Tuning the threshold to 0.2, the model can detect all
HOIC and most LOIC, XSS, injection and web brute force attacks. Miniscule detection
boost is shown for probe and botnet attacks. Tuning the threshold does slightly penalize
the precision and specificity.
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Figure 18 — Attack Classification Report for 15_15_15_15. Top is threshold of 0.5,
bottom is threshold of 0.20
Between the models shown in Table 24, the best model to use is dependent on the
situation and the goals the IDS intends to achieve. If the goal of the IDS is to detect new
attacks, especially DoS/DDoS attacks, using 15_15_15_15 with the threshold of 0.2 is the
ideal choice, as it has the best F1 score, maximizing the number of attacks detected, and
minimizes the number of false alarms. However, if there are circumstances where the
optimal threshold cannot be obtained or cannot be trusted, then 15_15_15 with the default
threshold is the next best choice, as it has the highest precision and can detect above the
expected scope (LOIC attacks).
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4.3.

Random Forest
This section includes all the work done with RF. First, the details about the

preprocessing stage are discussed, followed by results and analysis of both experiments 1
and 2.
4.3.1. Dataset Preprocessing
This section provides tallies/distributions of OBOA, RBOA training, validation,
test, and evaluation sets, and lists the selected features and reasoning.
4.3.1.1. Training, Test and Evaluation Sets
A different package of data is generated for RF. This includes a new training set,
test set and evaluation set. No validation set is created because cross validation is used to
validate the model’s performance during training. The test set is used to verify the model.
Finally, the evaluation set is like the DNN evaluation set, except it contains 0.2% extra
benign data. None of these datasets are scaled, as scaling is not required for RF. The test
set is a 25% split from the training data.
The same method is used to organize the datasets. The total distributions between
train and testing sets from each dataset are NF-BoT-IoT composes 4.6% of with 264,632
total samples, NF-ToN-IoT composes 93.4% with 5,404,368 total samples, and NFUNSW-NB15 composes 2% with 117,354 total samples. The r ratio for each is 50%, an
equal split between benign and anomalous data.
With regards to the OBOA and RBOA versions, the attack data in each is the
exact same, and the total benign samples in both are the exact same. The only difference
between the two is the RBOA benign data is from the target network. SMOTE is not used
to generate any new samples for the RBOA train and test sets.
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Attack
Probe
Backdoor
Benign
DoS/DDoS
Exploits
Fuzzers
Generic
Shellcode
Worms
Injection
MITM
Brute Force
Ransomware
XSS
Sum

Training Data
Test Data
Count
%
Count
%
452,777
5.9%
151,794
5.9%
5,110
0.1%
1,684
0.1%
3,834,765
50.0%
1,278,255
50.0%
2,116,147
27.6%
704,465
27.6%
21,714
0.3%
7,233
0.3%
11,341
0.1%
3,965
0.2%
2,246
0.0%
768
0.0%
532
0.0%
179
0.0%
108
0.0%
35
0.0%
196,138
2.6%
65,549
2.6%
2,215
0.0%
694
0.0%
323,834
4.2%
107,763
4.2%
969
0.0%
310
0.0%
701,517
9.1%
233,783
9.1%
7,669,413
100%
2,556,477
100%

Table 25 — Distribution of training and test data for OBOA and RBOA sets

Full Evaluation
Attack
Benign
Bot
Brute Force -Web
Brute Force -XSS
DDOS attack-HOIC
DDoS attacks-LOIC-HTTP
DoS attacks-GoldenEye
DoS attacks-Hulk
DoS attacks-SlowHTTPTest
DoS attacks-Slowloris
FTP-BruteForce
Infiltration
SQL Injection
SSH-Bruteforce
Sum

AR Evaluation

Count
%
Count
%
10,370,746
82.3%
10,370,746
93.5%
143,097
1.1%
0
0.0%
2,094
0.0%
2094
0.0%
895
0.0%
895
0.0%
1,080,858
8.6%
0
0.0%
280,337
2.2%
0
0.0%
27,723
0.2%
27,723
0.2%
432,487
3.4%
432,487
3.9%
14,116
0.1%
14,116
0.1%
7,227
0.1%
7,227
0.1%
25,933
0.2%
25,933
0.2%
114,326
0.9%
114,326
1.0%
432
0.0%
432
0.0%
94,979
0.8%
94,979
0.9%
12,595,250
100.0% 11,090,958
100.0%

Table 26 — Distribution of evaluation sets for OBOA and RBOA versions
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4.3.1.2. Feature Selection
In total, 27 features are used for the RF model. As RF has automatic feature
selection built into its algorithm, there is no real need for manual feature selection unless
reducing computational complexity or manipulating features to boost model performance.
By this, this is the same reason OUT_BYTES, OUT_DURATION, IN_PKTS,
OUT_PKTS is excluded in the deep learning experiments: to detect LOIC attacks. Prior
experimentation with these features made it impossible for models to detect LOIC
attacks. However, for experimentation purposes, these features are included to witness
the number of trees that are generated without these features, revealed in experiment 2.
Feature Name
L4_DST_PORT
PROTOCOL
L7_PROTO
IN_BYTES
IN_PKTS
OUT_BYTES
OUT_PKTS

Feature Name
MIN_TTL
MAX_TTL
LONGEST_FLOW_PKT
SHORTEST_FLOW_PKT
MIN_IP_PKT_LEN
MAX_IP_PKT_LEN
DURATION_IN

TCP_FLAGS

DURATION_OUT
FTP_COMMAND_RET_C
ODE

CLIENT_TCP_FLAGS

Feature Name
TCP_WIN_MAX_IN
TCP_WIN_MAX_OUT
ICMP_TYPE
ICMP_IPV4_TYPE
DNS_QUERY_ID
DNS_QUERY_TYPE
DNS_TTL_ANSWER
FLOW_DURATION_MILLISEC
ONDS
SERVER_TCP_FLAGS

Table 27 — Selected 27 Features for RF
4.3.2. Experiment 1 - Interpretability of Benign and Anomalous Data
This experiment is an exact repeat of 4.2.2 and verifies the established
conclusions. Each selected RF model is trained twice, once of the OBOA dataset and
another on the RBOA dataset. Once trained, both OBOA and RBOA versions of the RF
are evaluated on the exact same AR evaluation set.
4.3.2.1. Models
Five models are chosen from three different random searches using 5-fold cross
validation. All random searches are executed on the OBOA training data. E11, and E21
are the best models from two separate random searches. E01, E02, E03, are the top three
RFs from the last random search, which tested the most models.
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Model

N

Max

Max

Min samples

Min samples

estimators

features

depth

split

leaf

E01

300

Log2

20

7

3

E02

400

Log2

20

3

7

E03

400

sqrt

20

11

20

E11

500

sqrt

15

8

12

E21

250

sqrt

12

3

15

Table 28 — Random Forest Models
4.3.2.2. Results
The results from each OBOA, RBOA model on the test sets demonstrates
exceedingly great performance. Each RF model can near perfectly fit all the of the
training data and understand each attack within it. The F1 score for each RF model on the
test set is either 0.99 or 0.98, indicating a strong reliable classifier. If this IDS is
implemented on the same networks it received its training data, then it would perform
perfectly for detection of the expected scope of attacks.
However, the goal of this IDS is to be implemented on the NF-CSE-CIC-IDS2018
target network. The average OBOA IDS recall in Table 30 on the AR evaluation set is
0.69, meanwhile the average specificity is 0.93. This indicates the OBOA models can
correctly identify 69% of total attacks, and 93% of total benign traffic. This demonstrates
the model can roughly distinguish most attacks from benign data, and the model does not
classify all traffic as anomalous. Therefore, the transferability of anomalous data is
verified with RF using a completely new training procedure and training set.
Comparison of the OBOA, RBOA RF models on the AR evaluation set will
verify the transferability of benign data. The average OBOA AR evaluation set precision
and specificity is 0.39 and 0.93. For RBOA, the average precision and specificity is 0.99
and 0.98. For the average OBOA IDS, it can predict 93% of benign traffic, but 39% of
the anomalous predictions are correct, indicating many false positives. The average
RBOA IDS can identify 99% of total benign data and 98% of its anomalous predictions
are correct. This demonstrates that an IDS trained on benign data from foreign networks
can interpret traffic on the target network, but the IDS will perform better when trained
on benign data from the target network.
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The overall performance of the OBOA RFs is heavily penalized by the large
volume of FP predictions. The average F1 score is 0.50, where the average precision is
0.39 and average recall is 0.69. Although feasible for network implementation, the
OBOA IDSs are not a completely trustworthy because of the high volume of false
positives. The best performing OBOA IDS is E03, with F1 score of 0.52, and precision,
recall of 0.42, 0.70. The RBOA counterparts of each IDS are superior. The average
RBOA IDS F1, precision and recall are 0.88, 0.98 and 0.8. In addition to the decreased
number of FPs, the RBOA model can predict 11% more attacks using the exact same
attack data during training. This verifies the impact the benign data has on the IDS, and
the RBOA training set generation procedure should be used. The best performing RBOA
IDSs are E03 and E21 both with F1 score of 0.92.

Figure 19 — E03 attack report for OBOA (top) and RBOA (bottom) versions
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Since E03 is the best performing IDS for both OBOA and RBOA scenarios, its
improvement can be observed. The OBOA version is only able to fully detect DoS/DDoS
attacks using Slowloris, Hulk and GoldenEye. It can detect most brute force FTP attacks,
and a miniscule number of brute force SSH and probe attacks. The RBOA version can
detect all types of attacks except SQL injection. It can fully detect brute force via SSH,
FTP attacks, and all DoS/DDoS attacks. The detection of probe attacks is double the
OBOA version and only a few brute force web and XSS attacks are detected.
The confusion matrices between RBOA, OBOA versions of E01, E03 and E21
with default thresholds on the AR evaluation set is shown below. The performance boost
between the OBOA and RBOA models is apparent. RBOA E01 performs well in the
manner that is has the lowest number of FPs between any of the tested models. However,
it also detects the lowest number of attacks. Between E03 and E21, E03 is the preferred
IDS as it detects more attacks and has less FPs in both scenarios.
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Model

OBOA

RBOA

E01

E03

E21

Table 29 — Confusion Matrices for OBOA, RBOA E01, E03, E21 RF models
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OBOA
Model

Metric

Test Set

RBOA
Evaluation

Test Set

Set (AR)

E01

E02

E03

E11

E21

Evaluation
Set (AR)

AUC

0.99

0.86

1

0.95

F1 Score

0.98

0.48

0.99

0.85

Precision

0.99

0.38

0.99

0.98

Recall

0.98

0.67

0.99

0.75

Specificity

0.99

0.93

0.99

0.99

AUC

0.99

0.85

1

0.95

F1 Score

0.98

0.50

0.99

0.85

Precision

0.99

0.40

0.99

0.98

Recall

0.97

0.69

0.99

0.76

Specificity

0.99

0.93

0.99

0.99

AUC

0.99

0.85

1

0.95

F1 Score

0.98

0.52

0.99

0.92

Precision

0.99

0.42

0.99

0.98

Recall

0.97

0.70

0.99

0.87

Specificity

0.99

0.93

0.99

0.99

AUC

1

0.85

1

0.95

F1 Score

0.98

0.52

0.99

0.85

Precision

0.99

0.41

0.99

0.98

Recall

0.97

0.69

0.99

0.76

Specificity

0.99

0.93

0.99

0.99

AUC

0.99

0.84

1

0.95

F1 Score

0.98

0.47

0.99

0.92

Precision

0.99

0.36

0.99

0.98

Recall

0.97

0.70

0.99

0.86

Specificity

0.99

0.91

0.99

0.99

Table 30 — Summary of OBOA and RBOA results for RF models
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4.3.3. Experiment 2 – IDS for Maximum Attack Coverage
This experiment evaluates the developed RF models on the full evaluation set
containing attacks unknown to the IDS. Since experiment 1 displays the superiority of the
RBOA trained models, only the RBOA models are used in this experiment. It is
important to note that because the features OUT_BYTES, OUT_DURATION, IN_PKTS,
OUT_PKTS are included in data, the RF models discussed cannot be fairly compared to
the DNN version of this experiment.
4.3.3.1. Models
The models used in this experiment are E03 and E01 from experiment 1. Refer to
Table 28 for the parameters used when training these models. E03 is chosen for
presenting the best results using the default threshold in experiment 1. E01 is chosen for
having the highest AUC on the full evaluation set.
4.3.3.2. Results

Figure 20 — ROC Curves of selected RF models on full evaluation set
Each model is evaluated two times on the full evaluation set. Once using the
default classification threshold of 0.5 and another using the best classification threshold
determined by Youdens J statistic on the ROC curve. Using the default threshold, neither
model can detect LOIC, HOIC and botnet attacks. Similar results can be seen with
DNNs. The difference is the DNNs can detect LOIC attacks, but this is purely because
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the features are manipulated to allow the model to do so. When the optimal threshold is
determined for the RF, it is still unable to detect LOIC attacks.

Figure 21 — Attack Report for E01 using threshold=0.5 (top) and optimal threshold
(bottom)
Onwards, the adjusted threshold allows the models to detect most HOIC attacks
and all botnet attacks. Most other attacks, such as XSS, SQL Injection, brute force web
attacks are also detected. Probe attacks see a significant detection boost as well, but the
missed probe attacks still outweigh the detected probe attacks. A common drawback
between all threshold adjusted models is the increase in FPs.
An important factor to consider is also the optimal threshold. The optimal
thresholds are extremely low (> 0.006). Since RF is an ensemble method, and uses voting
to determine the output, such a low threshold translates to the output being reliant on
0.6% of the decision trees in the RF. For E03, using the optimal threshold means the
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output is reliant on 2 decision trees (400 × 0.005). For E01, the output is reliant on a
single decision tree (300 × 0.003). Reliance on such few decision trees defeats the
advantages provided by RF. Therefore, utilization of RF to maximize attack coverage
using threshold tuning is not ideal. However, RF is a good option for detecting specific
attack scopes without a custom threshold, as seen in the AR evaluation set. A summary of
results is shown in Table 31. The adjusted threshold results are in grey.

Model Threshold Metric
AUC
F1 Score
Precision
0.5
Recall
Specificity
E03
F1 Score
Precision
0.005369
Recall
Specificity
AUC
F1 Score
Precision
0.5
Recall
Specificity
E01
F1 Score
Precision
0.003404
Recall
Specificity

Full Evaluation Set
0.87
0.43
0.98
0.28
0.99
0.57
0.47
0.75
0.81
0.90
0.39
0.98
0.24
0.99
0.67
0.60
0.76
0.89

Table 31 — RF Results for maximum attack coverage
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Model

Threshold = 0.5

Threshold = Optimal Threshold

E03
Optimal
Threshold
=
0.005369

E01
Optimal
Threshold
=
0.003404

Table 32 — Confusion Matrices for RF Maximum Attack Detection
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Chapter 5 — Conclusion & Future Work
5.1.

Conclusion
In this thesis, the transferability of NetFlow data from a foreign network for a

machine learning based IDS is explored. This research demonstrates that in scenarios
where absolutely no data is available from the target network for IDS training, data from
a foreign source or global repository can be used instead. If benign data from the target
network is available, but attack data is not, then the benign data from the target network
can be mixed with attack data from a foreign network to create a powerful IDS. In
addition, this thesis studies situations where the IDS is faced with detecting unique
attacks it has never seen before, and methods to boost its performance for such scenarios.
Four IDS datasets are used, each which represents a unique purpose network and
contains unique attacks. Three of the four datasets are used to train the IDS, and the last
dataset is used to evaluate the IDS. This simulates a scenario where an IDS trained
completely on foreign network data is applied onto a separate, independent network. It is
studied whether this IDS training scheme can provide adequate attack coverage for a
certain scope of attacks. The IDSs developed in this thesis are trained on mostly IoT
network traffic, and the evaluation network is a conventional wired network.
The first experiment concludes the transferability of both benign and anomalous
traffic from foreign networks (OBOA training data). IDSs trained on benign, anomalous
data from completely different networks can roughly distinguish benign and anomalous
target network traffic. However, such IDSs output a large number of FPs and have a
limited scope of attack detection. Another training scheme is tested to address these
issues where the benign data used to train the IDS originates from the network the IDS is
to be implemented on, and the attack data is from foreign networks (RBOA training
data). This method not only significantly decreases the number of FPs, but broadens the
IDSs scope of attacks, allowing for more attacks to be detected. In addition, this scheme
allows most machine learning models to succeed as IDSs, whereas the other training
scheme requires strict machine learning hyperparameter tuning. The closing
recommendations from this experiment is training an IDS on target network benign data
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in conjunction with foreign network attacks provides the best results for scenarios where
collecting target network attack data is logistically difficult. If collecting benign data is
also an issue, using foreign network benign traffic for IDS training is a worst case
scenario option, and the IDS will be far less reliable.
The second experiment evaluates IDS detection on attack types/tools which have
zero similarity and representation in the IDS training data. This experiment aims to
improve detection for zero-day attacks and attacks the IDS is unfamiliar with. By using
RBOA training data, feature selection and ROC analysis, the IDSs successfully have an
increased detection scope.
Both experiments are completed using DNNs and RF. Comparing both models on
experiment 1, DNN is preferred for when using OBOA training data, but the models
hyperparameters must be perfectly tuned. When using RBOA training data, RF is the
preferred scheme as the average model easily achieves a higher F1 score compared to
DNN with more lenient tuning. Experiment 2, development of IDS attack coverage,
demonstrates RF is not an ideal machine learning algorithm with threshold tuning
because the RF becomes reliant on one or two decisions trees. Thus, DNNs are the
preferred algorithm while using threshold tuning to detect new attacks.
5.2.

Future Work
The work from this thesis has unlocked a variety of future research ideas for IDS

development.
The first area of research is to determine an optimal method to distribute attack
data in the IDS training set. This thesis used an algorithm to automatically distribute the
attack data, based on the distribution in the original training datasets. This led to
unbalanced distributions of attack types in the training data. For example, 45% of the
total attack data is DoS/DDoS, while probes represent 25%, and brute force attacks
represent 30%. Ultimately, the task is to identify a method to distribute these attacks and
tools in the training data to maximize IDS performance.
The second area of research is determining the similarity of different attack tools.
In this thesis, the IDS training set did not contain any HULK, Slowloris, or Slowhttptest
DoS/DDoS data, yet the developed IDSs easily detected these tools. Other tools of
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similar nature like HOIC, LOIC and botnet were not detected by the IDS unless using
feature selection or threshold tuning. It can be concluded that some attack tools operate
like other tools, while others may not operate in a similar manner. Identification of
similar tools can streamline IDS training data generation and reduce redundancy within
it.
The third area of research is dataset shift for IDS. The training set for the DNN
IDS in this thesis is composed of 80% benign data. The distribution of data in production
is ever changing and varies from the distribution in the training data. This has an impact
on the IDS performance. This is a foreseeable issue as this will cause false IDS
predictions and result in unreliability.
The final recommendation is to improve existing IDS datasets. The UQ-NIDS-v2
dataset is a step in right direction by unifying multiple IDS datasets under the same
features. However, there is work available to improve this dataset. For instance, labelling
which tool is used for which attacks is a tremendous benefit. This would allow for easier
analysis of the data, see which attacks are similar, and provide more control for training
data generation and filtering.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: GITHUB
The results and notebook files are available on GitHub at the following URL:
https://github.com/wmati/Transferability-of-Netflow-Data-for-IDS. This repository does
not include the training, validation, testing and evaluation dataset files.
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